Australia risks running out of missiles due to dependence on US
Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Australia faces a serious risk of running short of critical missiles in any major Indo-Pacific conflict because of its heavy dependence on the United States for advanced munitions, according to POLITICO. The strain on American stockpiles from the ongoing conflict with Iran has intensified long-standing concerns in Canberra about limited domestic production capacity and the prioritization of US needs over allied deliveries.
POLITICO reports that Canberra’s defense plans rely heavily on US-made weapons. As the US replenishes its inventories after heavy expenditure in the Iran campaign, foreign orders—including those from Australia—could be delayed. A Center for Strategic and International Studies study found that by May, just 39 days into the conflict, the US had already expended more than a thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles, and production rates were struggling to keep pace.
Charles Edel, Australia’s chair at CSIS, told POLITICO that the war in Iran was “putting an enormous strain” on US stockpiles and “likely extending the timeline to replenish them.” He added: “This will put missile deliveries to allies like Australia at a growing risk of delay — potentially exposing gaps in their defenses.”
Shadow Minister for Defense of Australia James Paterson echoed these concerns. He said recent conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran have created a global shortage and a “very long queue to be resupplied.”
“If a high intensity conflict broke out in the Indo-Pacific, Australia would be dangerously exposed with limited stocks of munitions for strike and interceptors for air and missile defense, or the ability to manufacture them at scale,” Paterson warned.
After the Cold War, Australia’s munitions sector entered a period of “strategic drift and complacency,” according to maritime security specialist Jennifer Parker. Production capacity across much of the West declined sharply. Parker told POLITICO: “Whether it’s the US or another country, if we are entirely dependent on that country for production of something that is critical to our war effort, our critical war stocks, of course they will prioritize themselves.”
Australia currently has an order for roughly 220 American-made Tomahawk missiles and has also committed $736 million to acquire long-range AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missiles—the first foreign sale of the system. Washington approved up to 450 missiles, but Australia’s initial funding suggests around 90 units, with deliveries not expected until 2033. Other critical systems, including THAAD interceptors, Patriot missiles, SM-6 surface-to-air missiles, JASSM, and Precision Strike Missiles, have also seen heavy use in the Iran conflict and could be central to any future Taiwan contingency.
According to an earlier POLITICO article, US military operations against Iran have depleted most of the Pentagon’s global stockpile of long-range missiles. While President Donald Trump has publicly rejected claims of shortages, administration officials privately worry that depleted inventories could complicate plans to defend Taiwan as early as 2027. Replenishing stocks will take years. In mid-August, the Pentagon awarded Raytheon a $22.9 billion, seven-year contract to increase annual Tomahawk production from about 60 to more than 1,000 missiles.
In response, Australia has accelerated efforts to rebuild domestic capacity through the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. The program aims to build two purpose-built guided-missile factories by 2029 and an Australian munitions factory for longer-range artillery ammunition by 2030. A spokesperson for Defense Minister Richard Marles said: “We are making missiles in Australia for the first time since the early 1970s,” and added that “some of the most advanced missiles in the world” will be built domestically.
Norwegian firm Kongsberg Defence Australia is developing a manufacturing and maintenance facility at Newcastle Airport, near a major air base. Two of its systems—the Naval Strike Missile and the Joint Strike Missile—are expected to enter production by the end of 2027, with production capacity designed to exceed Australia’s stated requirements, enabling the country to meet surge demand. John Fry, managing director of Kongsberg Defence Australia, described a broader Western decline in guided-weapons production capacity that Australia is now trying to reverse.
Paterson accused the Australian government of a “bad habit of exaggerating what is happening” in the GWEO program, saying it was passing “small-scale final assembly off as sovereign manufacturing” and announcing orders whose delivery dates are still years away. Parker asked bluntly: “Is it enough and is it fast enough? No.”
Former US officials have urged Canberra to move faster on asymmetric capabilities, including military underwater drones for surveillance, mine detection, and offensive roles. Mark Montgomery, former director of operations at US Pacific Command, told POLITICO that Australia has an opportunity to become, alongside Taiwan and Japan, “a source of asymmetric weapons development—that’s a much easier entry point than fighter jets, helicopters or shipboard combat systems.”
Edel framed the Iran conflict as validation of Australia’s local-production goals. “What was once a gradual, decade-long buildup now needs to move at warp speed to close stockpile gaps and strengthen allied capacity,” he said. Speeding up Australian production, he argued, would not only meet the Australian Defence Force’s needs but also expand the broader allied inventory, boost readiness, and strengthen deterrence.
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has identified 2028 as a particularly dangerous window, citing depleted munitions stockpiles, the final year of the Trump administration, and potential political developments in Taiwan as possible “tripwires.” While not yet a certainty, he described a rising possibility that demands clear-sighted preparation.
Australia’s defense architecture has been built around access to American systems. Until domestic production reaches meaningful scale and Australia reduces its near-total dependence on imported long-range strike and defensive interceptors, the country will remain exposed in any high-intensity regional conflict.