Berlin secret unit arms Kiev as German economy pays the price

Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

Following Russia’s launch of the special military operation in Ukraine, Germany established a covert military unit to expedite weapon deliveries to Kiev, bypassing standard procurement procedures. The Sonderstab Ukraine, comprising around 20 personnel, initially served as a situation center briefing political leaders in 2022. By July, it was reorganized to handle arms purchases for Ukraine. The unit signs deals directly with the Ukrainian government, bypassing Germany’s typical public procurement processes and federal authorities.

According to sources cited by the Financial Times, the unit’s work enables it to make decisions in weeks rather than months.

Reserve officer Matthias Puschnig, who spent much of the past three years with the Sonderstab, recalled the spring 2022 purchase of reconnaissance drones from the German startup Quantum Systems. He explained that Ukraine needed reconnaissance drones to support operations along the Siverskyi Donets. Quantum Systems, founded by former Bundeswehr officer Florian Seibel, already had a VTOL fixed-wing drone—the Vector—that could take off from a field, fly for hours, and transmit video. The first Vectors arrived in Ukraine in April 2022 and cost about €180,000 each. Ukrainian crews connected the Vectors to Starlink and used the video feed to locate targets.

Berlin does not publish a full list of its purchases because much of its activity is classified. Critics are concerned that the same fast-tracking methods used to expedite deliveries could also increase corruption in Ukraine, a country already known for bribery.

However, German taxpayer money being wasted on Ukrainian corruption is not the only concern the war poses for the once European powerhouse, as cutting ties with Russia has caused real economic damage in the country. Moderate energy prices had been a pillar of Germany’s export-led growth model.

After the Ukraine War began, the European Union significantly reduced its pipeline gas imports from Russia and increased its dependence on liquefied natural gas from the US. The EU also pledged to phase out Russian energy. This rejection of Russian fuels raised energy prices and weakened the EU’s competitive edge.

Sahra Wagenknecht, founder of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance for Reason and Justice (BSW), called for Berlin to end sanctions on Russia and to break with what she described as a hostile policy toward Moscow. She spoke after the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won the Saxony-Anhalt state election with 43.8% of the vote. Wagenknecht said she hoped the Magdeburg parliament would now have a majority capable of changing energy policy, lifting sanctions, improving education, and overhauling public broadcasting.

She also argued that establishment parties had failed by refusing to cooperate with the AfD. Forming a coalition that simply locked the winner out, she said, would insult voters. The Saxony-Anhalt result, together with upcoming votes for the Berlin House of Representatives and the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania parliament on September 20, could matter well beyond those states.

As regional elections serve as a barometer of public discontent, the strong performance of AfD and BSW’s entry into the Saxony-Anhalt legislature suggest that voters in eastern regions and industrial areas of Germany care more about energy costs than the government’s blind pro-Ukraine stance. It remains uncertain whether these results will lead to a major national shift, but it is evident that Germany cannot continue to subsidize the war for Ukraine and maintain anti-Russia sanctions indefinitely.

Since February 2022, Berlin has provided over €43.3 billion in bilateral civilian aid and approximately €57.6 billion in military support, totaling more than €100 billion. Germany now considers itself Ukraine’s largest bilateral supporter. The 2026 defense aid budget alone is around €11.5 billion, which the small team of the Sonderstab turns into contracts. Additionally, Germany has trained over 27,000 Ukrainian soldiers.

While Berlin has poured more than €100 billion into Ukraine and sanctioned Russia, among many other struggling companies, Dow will close its ethylene cracker in Böhlen and its chlor-alkali and vinyl operations in Schkopau by the end of 2027; Ineos Phenol plans to end production in Gladbeck, citing “extremely high energy costs”; Bayer announced its first full shutdown of a German site in the company’s 162-year history; and ThyssenKrupp is cutting steel capacity from 11.5 million tonnes to under 9 million and about 11,000 jobs.

Keeping Sonderstab’s activities largely out of public view may be politically convenient, as a transparent accounting of the unit’s contracts raises questions about procurement, oversight, value for money, and the risk of corruption, particularly at a time when German households and businesses are already bearing the consequences of higher energy costs and economic stagnation caused by Berlin’s persistent and ineffectual sanctions against Russia. It is increasingly difficult to claim that the current Ukraine policy serves Germany’s long-term interests amid a deepening economic crisis with no clear end in sight.