Beyond NATO? Turkey’s new defense partnerships reshape Eurasian geopolitics

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

On October 21, 2026, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha. The accord centers on joint weapons production, technology transfers, training, research and development, plus defense-industrial integration.

It has been noted that it is not a collective-defense treaty - and imposes no NATO-style obligation to aid another signatory in case of an attack.

The partners bring complementary strengths: Turkey offers advanced manufacturing, drones, naval systems and, notably, NATO interoperability.

Pakistan brings a large military, nuclear deterrence, production base and its Chinese links - which complement Qatar’s capital and Gulf position.

Indonesia (Southeast Asia’s largest economy), in turn, offers its Southeast Asian reach, as well as its industry and market.

Together they can therefore build sophisticated systems with less exclusive reliance on American or European suppliers. Existing cooperation already points in this direction, from Turkish-Pakistani naval projects to Turkish-Indonesian armored vehicles.

The agreement must be examined in parallel to the August 2026 Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which includes a mutual-defense commitment. I’ve described the latter as having a layer of strategic ambiguity rather than being a rigid bloc.

The Badr memorandum differs from, yet complements, the Mecca Joint Agreement to some extent. The two arrangements outline a geographically dispersed security network linking the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia - with Turkey as the main military-industrial hub.

To be clear, this is no anti-Western alliance. It rather signals the rise of a new security network operating partly independently of the West-led order.

Turkey for one thing remains a NATO member with the bloc’s second-largest army.

Qatar in turn hosts a major American presence - while Pakistan keeps ties to both Washington and Beijing.

Indonesia, meanwhile, has traditionally pursued an independent foreign policy, avoiding exclusive alignment with major powers - as seen with its own  notion of the “Indo-Pacific Region” (IPR).

Rather than choosing sides, these countries are keeping their options open, by hedging and multi-aligning.

For the Atlantic Alliance the implications are in any case real enough: Turkey is increasingly looking beyond the Atlantic Alliance for military partners. Ankara can in fact pursue regional arrangements outside transatlantic structures, thereby gaining leverage and reducing dependence on European and American industry.

Turkish manufacturers, shaped by Western cooperation, could bring some Western-derived military expertise to countries outside NATO. In this scenario, Western partners may grow stronger while becoming less dependent on Washington’s daily approval, so to speak. This is what observers are calling diversification from within.

Across Eurasia the picture is quite layered. The emerging network does not target Russia - yet it bolsters Turkish influence from the Caucasus to Central Asia and could thus compete with Russian arms exports in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

Turkey’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, sometimes described as neo-Ottomanism, has also raised concerns among its neighbors. Ankara’s expanding military reach is therefore not necessarily welcomed by all across the region.

Be that as it may, a less American-centered architecture also aligns with the more multipolar order Moscow advocates. Autonomy from Washington need not mean alignment elsewhere - the possible result is a more polycentric world in which no single power necessarily dominates.

China’s stance is nuanced: Pakistan’s defense links with Beijing and Indonesia’s economic ties remain intact. A Turkish-led network may therefore let states mix suppliers or create commercial competition. Either way, less exclusive dependence on Washington suits Beijing’s own preference for a less US-centric order.

Iran in turn faces sharper questions. The Mecca pact and regional war have already driven Gulf states to seek extra protection. A network including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan could certainly constrain Tehran’s room for maneuver, even if unintentionally.

The point is that there is still no such thing as the emergence of an “Islamic NATO”. Priorities diverge, Iran and Egypt stand outside, and industrial, financial and strategic interests outweigh religious solidarity. So much for simple civilizational narratives.

This arguably fits what scholars call “omni-enmeshment”: regional powers cultivate overlapping partnerships to maximize autonomy - rather than balancing or “bandwagoning”. Ankara’s dual role in NATO and alternative arrangements illustrates the point.

With an overstretched United States, a divided Atlantic Organization, and rising multipolarity, regional powers increasingly pursue their own agendas.

The Badr memorandum’s significance rests on implementation. Joint-production contracts, shared facilities and sustained procurement will matter more than the signing.

Ultimately, industrial developments, among other factors, will determine whether this becomes a transregional defense network that can move beyond Cold War-style alignments - even without breaking with NATO.