BRICS: A Strategic Balancing Act or a Trojan Horse

By Dr. Iram Sarwar

India’s foreign policy increasingly presents one of the most interesting contradictions in contemporary geopolitics. New Delhi positions itself as a leading voice of the Global South and an important member of BRICS, while simultaneously deepening strategic partnerships with the United States and other Western powers. This dual-track diplomacy reflects India’s determination to maximize its strategic autonomy and national interests. Yet it also raises an important question: can India simultaneously strengthen a grouping intended to promote a more balanced international order while aligning closely with the very powers whose dominance BRICS seeks to challenge?

India’s approach can be described as strategic hedging. Rather than committing itself completely to either the Western or emerging-power camp, New Delhi seeks advantages from both. Membership in BRICS provides India with diplomatic visibility, access to emerging economic partnerships and a platform through which it can influence debates about global governance. At the same time, its expanding relationship with Washington provides access to technology, investment, defence cooperation and a stronger position in the Indo-Pacific.

From New Delhi’s perspective, there may be nothing inherently contradictory about this approach. India has long promoted the principle of “strategic autonomy,” preferring flexibility over formal alignment with any single bloc. However, from the perspective of some BRICS advocates, India’s growing proximity to Western strategic structures creates a fundamental tension within the organization.

The contradiction becomes particularly visible in India’s relationship with China. On one hand, China is frequently portrayed in Indian strategic discourse as a major security and geopolitical challenge. Border disputes, competition in the Indian Ocean and rivalry over regional influence remain important elements of India’s security calculations. On the other hand, China is also one of India’s most important partners within BRICS and a central force behind the organization’s broader economic and geopolitical ambitions.

This creates an uncomfortable balancing act. India wants BRICS to provide greater opportunities for itself while remaining cautious about any transformation of the organization into a cohesive geopolitical bloc. A stronger and more strategically coordinated BRICS could challenge aspects of the Western-led international system, but it could also reduce India’s ability to maintain close relations with Washington and other Western capitals.

India’s role in the Indo-Pacific further illustrates this dilemma. Through the Quad, New Delhi cooperates closely with the United States, Japan and Australia on issues ranging from maritime security to emerging technologies and regional stability. Although the Quad is not formally an anti-China alliance, its strategic significance is widely understood in the context of growing competition with Beijing. India therefore finds itself simultaneously cooperating with China in BRICS and participating in a Western-aligned strategic framework in which China is a principal concern.

The same tension can be observed in India’s relationship with other countries of the Global South. India frequently presents itself as an advocate for developing countries and a champion of a more representative international system. Yet its diplomatic disputes with countries such as Bangladesh and Malaysia have generated criticism from observers who question whether New Delhi’s regional policies always correspond with its rhetoric about Global South solidarity. vThe Iran question makes the contradiction even more complicated. Iran is a BRICS member and an important actor in the emerging multipolar order. At the same time, India has developed a close strategic and defence relationship with Israel. The situation becomes particularly sensitive when Israeli-Iranian tensions escalate into direct confrontation. New Delhi must then carefully balance relationships with two countries occupying sharply opposing positions in the Middle East.

This is why the “Trojan Horse” metaphor has gained attention in discussions about India’s position within BRICS. Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., a former vice president of the New Development Bank, has used the expression in criticism of India’s role and its closeness to Western strategic interests. The metaphor is politically powerful because it captures a concern among some BRICS supporters that an organization cannot become strategically autonomous if one of its major members simultaneously works within Western-led security structures.

Nevertheless, describing India simply as a “Trojan Horse” risks oversimplifying a much more complicated foreign policy. India is not merely an instrument of the West, nor is it a committed opponent of the Western order. It is pursuing a pragmatic strategy designed to preserve maximum freedom of action. New Delhi wants access to Western capital and technology while maintaining strong relations with Russia, participating in BRICS and expanding ties across the developing world.

The real challenge for BRICS, therefore, is not necessarily India’s membership but the competing strategic interests of its members. BRICS brings together countries with different political systems, security priorities and economic interests. If these differences produce mistrust, the organization may struggle to transform its economic weight into sustained geopolitical influence.

There is an important lesson here for the future of multipolarity. Organizations such as BRICS cannot become effective merely by expanding membership. They require strategic coherence, institutional trust and a willingness among members to cooperate despite bilateral disagreements. Otherwise, internal rivalries could weaken the very alternative international architecture that BRICS supporters seek to build.

India’s balancing strategy may be clever diplomacy from New Delhi’s perspective. It allows the country to engage simultaneously with competing centres of power and extract benefits from each relationship. But the long-term question is whether such balancing can continue indefinitely without creating contradictions.

India may ultimately prove that strategic autonomy can coexist with participation in multiple geopolitical groupings. Or it may demonstrate the limits of an approach in which every major relationship is pursued simultaneously.

For BRICS, the issue is not whether India should be forced to choose between East and West. The more important question is whether the organization can develop enough institutional strength and mutual confidence to withstand the competing strategic calculations of its members.

The future of BRICS will depend not simply on how many countries join it, but on whether its members genuinely agree on what kind of international order they want to create. India’s diplomatic balancing act will be one of the clearest tests of that ambition.

Dr. Iram Sarwar is working with the Punjab Government, and has an interest in current affairs.

Eurasia Review