BRICS Must Shift from Counter-Terrorism to Terrorism Prevention
By Prof. Chetan Singai
BRICS is no ordinary group. As National Security Adviser Ajit Doval emphasised at the BRICS security meet, its member states are home to nearly 4.2 billion people, contribute around US$ 31 trillion to the global economy, and collectively account for around 28 percent of the Earth's landmass. More importantly, BRICS is gaining muscle over time. This demographic, economic, and geographical scale gives the grouping not only influence but also responsibility. In an age of fractured multilateralism, BRICS cannot remain only an economic or diplomatic platform; it must become a serious security forum capable of preventing threats before they become tragedies.
In an age of fractured multilateralism, BRICS cannot remain only an economic or diplomatic platform; it must become a serious security forum capable of preventing threats before they become tragedies.
It is against this backdrop that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement on 23 June 2026, following his meeting with the National Security Advisers and senior security officials of BRICS countries, should be read as more than a formal diplomatic intervention. His emphasis on deeper security cooperation among BRICS members, particularly on terrorism, cyber security, and emerging technologies, points to the changing nature of global insecurity. The message is clear: terrorism is no longer a localised or episodic threat. It is transnational, technology-enabled, financially networked, and ideologically adaptive.
The Evolving Nature of the Terror Threat
The history of terrorism demonstrates the urgent need for a novel approach. Throughout the late twentieth century, terrorism was often framed in terms of identifiable organisations with territorial sanctuaries, armed training networks, and proxy conflicts. Since 2001, terrorism has become a central concern of international security, especially following 9/11 and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 in October 2001, making counter-terrorism a global phenomenon. India, however, had already experienced the long-standing and painful impact of cross-border terrorism, separatist violence, radicalisation, and proxy warfare. India has learnt through experiences ranging from Punjab and Kashmir to the Parliament attack, the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, Pulwama, and, more recently, the Pahalgam terror attack. These attacks are not merely acts of terror; they are intended to weaken public confidence, undermine developmental goals, and erode the resolve of democratic societies.
Today, terrorism has entered a more complex phase. Radicalisation can occur online, recruitment can take place through encrypted platforms, financing can move through hawala, shell entities, narcotics, illegal trade, or cryptocurrency, and attacks can be carried out using drones, artificial intelligence, and cyber tools. Terrorist organisations no longer need large training camps or visible command structures. A digital network, a grievance narrative, and a small logistical chain may be sufficient. This makes traditional, response-centric counter-terrorism inadequate.
A terror plot may be conceived in one jurisdiction, financed through another, facilitated by radicalisation in a third, and executed in a fourth. No state, however powerful, can address this challenge alone.
Addressing this evolving threat requires cooperation that extends beyond national borders, and this is where BRICS has an important role to play. Its expanded membership connects regions across Asia, Africa, Eurasia, West Asia, and Latin America. These regions face overlapping vulnerabilities, including porous borders, maritime insecurity, fragile governance environments, illicit financial flows, cyber manipulation, youth radicalisation, and the misuse of emerging technologies. A terror plot may be conceived in one jurisdiction, financed through another, facilitated by radicalisation in a third, and executed in a fourth. No state, however powerful, can address this challenge alone.
BRICS members suffer from the shared threat of terrorism. Russia is exposed to ISIS-linked risks and Eurasian spillovers; China frames the threat in terms of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; South Africa confronts ISIS sympathisers, financing, and transit risks; Egypt faces an insurgency in the Sinai; Ethiopia confronts the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and instability in the Horn of Africa; Iran suffers from ISIS-linked violence and West Asian volatility; Saudi Arabia and the UAE face risks to energy infrastructure and maritime corridors; Indonesia manages residual extremist networks and online radicalisation; and Brazil faces vulnerabilities related to illicit finance and organised crime. This diversity of threats strengthens the case for a common BRICS prevention grid.
Coordination, Planning, and Execution
An effective BRICS response should therefore be built around three interconnected pillars: coordination, planning, and execution.
Coordination is the first requirement. BRICS states should generate reliable networks and platforms among intelligence agencies, law-enforcement bodies, financial regulators, cyber-security agencies, and prosecution authorities, if not through dedicated institutions, then at least by co-opting existing institutional mechanisms. Institutions often work in silos, and this is one reason why terrorism survives and thrives. As a result, if border security does not engage with financial intelligence, or if local policing and cyber monitoring do not work together, and, more importantly, if national agencies do not share time-sensitive information, terror networks will exploit the gaps.
An effective BRICS response should therefore be built around three interconnected pillars: coordination, planning, and execution.
Planning is the second requirement. Many international counter-terror mechanisms become active only after an attack or an act of violence. A prevention-oriented BRICS framework, however, should be forward-looking and anticipatory. This translates into everything from shared threat assessments and early-warning indicators to mapping radicalisation networks, monitoring suspicious financial flows, coordinating action against online propaganda, and developing common legal standards for evidence-sharing, extradition, and prosecution. Technology governance also has to be part of these plans, as artificial intelligence, deepfakes, encrypted platforms, and autonomous systems play an ever-greater role in the complex threat landscape.
The third and final, but also most challenging, requirement is execution. International platforms issue strong declarations but are often weak in implementation. BRICS must avoid this trap. It will need to create dedicated nodal security agencies in every member state, connect secure communication channels between forces across borders, run joint training exercises with pre-determined methods of evaluation (and then measure adherence), and build explicit, verifiable standards. Rather than summit statements, BRICS now needs operational preparedness.
From Counter-terrorism to Prevention
Ultimately, the larger transition must be from counter-terrorism to terrorism prevention. Security policy cannot remain centred on responding to attacks; it must increasingly focus on preventing them. Prevention entails knowing where the risks of violence lie before mobilisation escalates into violence. It means cutting off finance before weapons are purchased. That means preventing radicalisation before recruitment is complete. It means getting one's house in order before a crisis unfolds. This also means bolstering communities, education systems, and digital literacy to ensure that extremist narratives make no headway.
The larger transition must be from counter-terrorism to terrorism prevention. Security policy cannot remain centred on responding to attacks; it must increasingly focus on preventing them.
Existing mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO RATS), which has ushered in a degree of cooperation in countering terror, separatism, and extremism in Eurasia, is not BRICS-wide and does not include a large swath of potential members from Africa, Latin America, West Asia, and Southeast Asia. The BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group and Action Plan, while having useful sub-groups on de-radicalisation, internet misuse, financing, and capacity-building, is still predominantly consultative. Efforts to counter terrorist financing are guided by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, but implementation gaps persist, as terrorists continue to exploit formal financial systems, informal money transfers, charities, trade, and virtual assets. Consequently, BRICS urgently requires a framework that is needs-based, competence-based, timely, and interoperable to prevent and disrupt terror financing, with clear mechanisms for accountability.
A BRICS terrorism-prevention framework should be based on the current Counter Terrorism Action Plan and in line with the work of the BRICS Working Group on Counter Terrorism. It should be anchored on five pillars. First, develop a common threat database including terrorist organisations, financiers, recruiters, platforms, and travel patterns. Second, establish a BRICS Financial Disruption Mechanism to monitor hawala, the narcotics trade, as well as shell corporations, unlawful markets, and crypto-asset-based terrorist financing. Third, establish a Digital Counter-Radicalisation Compact to tackle extremist propaganda, AI-generated hate content and deepfakes, as well as encrypted recruitment. Fourth, establish a Border and Mobility Cooperation Protocol based on the use of passenger information systems, biometric verification systems (where feasible), and risk profiling consistent with legal protection requirements. Fifth, establish a BRICS Centre for Terrorism Prevention to inform research, training, scenario planning, and the sharing of best practices on terrorism prevention.
Consequently, BRICS urgently requires a framework that is needs-based, competence-based, timely, and interoperable to prevent and disrupt terror financing, with clear mechanisms for accountability.
This proposed framework is certainly not new and builds on existing BRICS initiatives. The BRICS Working Group on Counter-Terrorism has already dealt with issues of de-radicalisation, internet misuse, and terrorist financing; it even works towards capacity-building. Now the task is to move from fragmented working-group conversations to an integrated prevention architecture. BRICS must turn political proximity into institutional capacity.
This agenda is inherently significant for India. India has consistently argued that there is no such thing as ‘good' or ‘bad’ terrorism. No politics, ideology, religion, or strategic convenience can justify terrorism. Nor can sovereignty be used as a shield for safe havens, financing networks, or proxy violence. A prevention-first BRICS framework would bolster India’s enduring position while also providing the Global South with an effective and practical security mechanism.
Prime Minister Modi’s June 23 statement and NSA Doval’s reminder of BRICS’ growing weight together offer an important opening. BRICS has the numbers, geography, as well as the resources and political relevance to build a new security structure. What it requires now is serious consideration by its institutions. The Global South does not need another forum that condemns terrorism after tragedy. BRICS can offer that mechanism, but only if it advances from rhetoric to readiness, from response to prevention, and from cooperation in principle to coordination in practice.
Prof. (Dr.) Chetan Singai is a Professor and Dean with the School of Law, Governance and Public Policy at Chanakya University, Bengaluru.
Observer Research Foundation