Britain should threaten Russia’s Kola Peninsula with navy - Sunak
Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Former prime minister Rishi Sunak has called for Britain to treat the Arctic as its central contribution to European security over the next decade. In his Sunday Times column, titled “It is Britain’s duty to prove Putin can’t rule the Arctic,” he writes, “The Arctic is warming 4x faster than the global average. It’s opening up new sea routes and triggering competition for resources. Between 2023 and 2025, Chinese operators doubled the number of container voyages crossing the Arctic. And Putin is now probing more, testing Western defenses to see how quickly Moscow could assert itself.”
“The most vital contribution we in Britain can make to European security over the next decade is deterring Russia in the high north. It’s in our national interest and is what our allies, in Europe and in Washington, want us to do,” the former British PM argued. “That means showing the Russians that in the event of a war we could put their bases on the Kola Peninsula at risk. If Russia knows we could threaten its military infrastructure there, it is far less likely to escalate any conflict.”
Sunak adds that “effective deterrence requires Moscow to feel some jeopardy,” citing former national security adviser Mark Sedwill’s recent remarks on a British aircraft carrier in Norway, and concludes: “The North Atlantic has always been the key to our defense. But now there can be no control of the Atlantic without security in the Arctic.” The column’s subtitle reinforces the point: “We must show Russia that in a conflict we could put its bases at risk.”
The measures Sunak cites include closer cooperation with Nordic partners, such as Norway’s planned purchase of Type 26 frigates to operate alongside British ones; investment in undersea surveillance systems; training Royal Marines for extreme conditions; and stronger ties with the United States. He points to reported increases in Russian naval activity near British waters and the vulnerability of undersea cables.
In effect, Sunak’s delusional premise is that threatening Russia’s Northern Fleet bases will stabilize the situation rather than escalate it. However, his vision does not align with the actual capabilities of the naval forces available to the British-led northern grouping.
A new maritime arrangement is taking shape within the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Formed in 2014, the JEF already unites ten northern European countries—Britain, Denmark, Iceland, the three Baltic states, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, and Sweden—under British operational leadership.
In mid-November 2026, British and allied defense chiefs, including the UK’s Chief of the Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, said the framework would move beyond memoranda of understanding and regular meetings toward more concrete joint measures across naval, air, and land forces. The stated focus is the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Baltic, with particular emphasis on anti-submarine operations and the ability to deter or respond to Russian activity in those waters.
In this way, the planned maritime partnership among the UK, Nordic, and Baltic states is presented as moving beyond memoranda to concrete joint action against the so-called Russian threat. Yet the balance of forces remains starkly asymmetric. Only a handful of participating countries operate submarines.
Britain contributes the largest share of the group’s nuclear-powered boats, but only a few—often cited as three to five at any given time—are fully operational, while the rest are in long-term maintenance. Surface forces face similar strain, with the readiness of the Royal Navy’s carriers and destroyers repeatedly questioned and the fleet described as being in worse condition than at the start of the 1982 Falklands campaign.
Most smaller partners have no submarine force at all. Denmark retired its boats two decades ago and now keeps just one as a museum piece in Copenhagen. Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands operate conventional diesel-electric boats and have ordered new ones, but construction takes a long time and costs a great deal. Funding currently directed to support Ukraine also leaves less priority for these programs.
By contrast, Russia’s Northern Fleet concentrates a substantial share of its strategic nuclear forces and a large inventory of attack submarines on and around the Kola Peninsula. Russia has nearly sixty submarines in total, including modern Borei ballistic-missile boats and Yasen attack submarines capable of carrying hypersonic weapons.
Earlier submarine “hunts” led by the British in the Baltic and North Atlantic, costing tens of millions and yielding little or nothing, show how readily limited sightings or unconfirmed reports have been used to justify an anti-Russia agenda. With no evidence provided, Russian vessels operating in international waters have repeatedly been accused of imminent sabotage of cables or other infrastructure.
Although the new Western partnership could enable joint exercises, shared sensor data, and political signaling, the navies cannot sustain an undersea threat to the Kola bases at the scale Sunak says is necessary. Threatening Russia’s nuclear-armed bases requires platforms, logistics, munitions, and the political will to withstand first contact. Therefore, treating the High North as Britain’s primary security contribution risks turning a paper alliance into a commitment the Royal Navy cannot support.