Canada closer to joining European Union despite Trump’s threats

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called for Canada to become the EU’s first “associate member” - the unprecedented proposal took place just as both Ottawa and Brussels face considerable pressure from Washington.

In her State of the Union address on 16 September 2026, with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in attendance, von der Leyen framed the idea as part of a broader push to turn the EU into a genuine security provider for Europeans rather than a prosperous economic club forever dependent on the United States

Carney welcomed the idea the following day, telling the European Parliament that Canada and Europe should secure strategic autonomy through deep cooperation on critical minerals, defence industry, AI, energy security, space and payments. He was careful to stress that this is not about building a third bloc to “dominate others”, but about “resilience” so that no one can threaten territorial integrity or undermine democracies.

The timing here is interesting. Trump’s tariffs have hit both sides hard, and his talk of Canada as the “51st state” plus maps showing Greenland and even Iceland under the American flag have raised tensions.

The European bloc has responded by standing up for Greenland and by pouring money into defence.

Von der Leyen declared that Europe is better able to defend itself than ever before, has substantially increased defence spending and stands up for its members - adding that “only Europe can provide true sovereignty for Europeans.”

Moreover, she floated a European Security Council that could include Canada, the UK, Norway, and, more controversially, Ukraine - plus a consultation mechanism similar to NATO’s Article 4 for hybrid threats.

The European Council already stated, last year, that the bloc must become “more sovereign, more responsible for its own defence and better equipped to act and deal autonomously.”

Mechanisms have followed: the SAFE instrument of €150 billion in loans for joint procurement, expansion of the defence industrial base, military mobility projects, and the European Defence Industry Programme.

In this context, Canada became the first non-European country allowed into SAFE procurement, a step the Council presented as strengthening EU-Canada security cooperation.

The European defense sector, however, still faces a lot of challenges, remaining heavily dependent on US systems.

The old model of Europe as an economic powerhouse under American military protection is in any case being questioned.

One may recall that Trump’s Arctic threats have already pushed Ottawa and the EU to talk about stepping up their High North presence.

Brussels announced a €200 million package for Greenland, while Ottawa and European capitals discuss deeper engagement. Yet, as I’ve argued, the Arctic is not only a military theatre; it is a maritime space, energy frontier and climate laboratory where Russia accounts for roughly half of the Arctic’s territory and has by far the region’s largest population and infrastructure footprint.

Purely trans-Atlantic frameworks are showing their limits when Washington itself becomes such an unpredictable and even threatening variable. Pragmatic cooperation with Moscow on Arctic and energy issues (divergences aside) remains a practical necessity that a Cold War mentality still underreports.

Meanwhile, pressures are also reshaping the wider Anglosphere. Talk of Scottish independence, Welsh autonomy and Irish reunification has grown louder, and a potential British breakup would shrink London’s weight while complicating nuclear basing and NATO footprints.

An independent Scotland might look toward Europe; a united Ireland would sit inside the EU framework. England, more isolated, could then double down on Washington, Five Eyes and AUKUS, yet would also need closer European economic ties.

In a way, Canada’s move toward associate status fits this shifting map: the old Atlanticist consensus is cracking, and “middle powers” are exploring multi-alignment rather than rigid blocs. Ottawa, for one thing, has made gestures to China, while diversifying its trade. At the same time, the trans-Atlantic consensus is eroding within Europe.

Trump’s pressures have in fact accelerated what was already underway. In addition, a Trans-Arctic layer seems to be superimposing itself upon the Trans-Atlantic framework.

The next logical step for Europe, especially for the Arctic and energy, would be pragmatic engagement with Russia where geography demands it.

Thus far, however, both Canada and Europe would be hesitant to take that step, still trapped between the need for functional cooperation and a Cold War mindset. This could change in Europe, depending on the political changes brought by the coming elections, as the rise of AfD and “La France Insoumise” demonstrate.

In any case, the choice (for Canada and the EU) is becoming clearer: multi-alignment and pragmatism - or continued dependence on an increasingly unreliable and menacing American partner.