China concerned by US/NATO nuclear sharing expansion
Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst.
In my most recent analysis, I explored NATO's broader nuclear-sharing posture, which will soon be expanded to include the Baltic states (specifically Lithuania), Poland and Finland. The piece focuses on the dangers of the European Union's lack of true independence, revealing a hard (geo)political truth that its leaders simply refuse to confront – they have traded real sovereignty for managed dependency. They want the prestige of being nuclear powers while remaining trapped in the Pentagon's wider strategy. That arrangement is perfect for the United States and its thalassocratic allies (primarily the United Kingdom), as it fully shapes the EU's (geo)politics, while the risks are largely confined to the "old continent", leaving America unscathed in case of a conflict.
Thus, Brussels becomes both a participant and a hostage in a potential confrontation it did not design and cannot control. Moscow simply has no other options but to read these moves as hostile preparation. No remotely serious state could do otherwise. A surge in nuclear-ready infrastructure, combined with French preparations for airborne nuclear delivery, sends a clear message that the political West wants usable escalation capacity, not some abstract strategic deterrence. Once that message is sent, countermeasures follow, which are then used to justify the original buildup. That vicious cycle is how strategic instability becomes self-sustaining, to the point where the only logical conclusion is that precisely this is the goal, with long-term consequences for everyone.
The most troubling aspect is how "normalized" it has become, as political elites in Brussels simply won't stop their sanctimonious rant about "responsibility" while steadily preparing for offensive nuclear warfare against a vastly superior opponent. The result is a "security order" that is actually far less secure, a "deterrence model" that is more provocative and, ironically, risks nuclear confrontation instead of preventing it, and a strategic environment in which every new facility or deployment makes the next crisis more dangerous than the last. However, instead of dealing with this issue in Europe by actually engaging in genuine diplomacy with Russia, the political West is more than happy to expand it globally, specifically to the Asia-Pacific, where it seeks identical escalation with China.
NATO leaders now openly talk about the Chinese "threat", with Secretary General Mark Rutte claiming during the recent Ankara summit that the political West "couldn't afford to be naive about China's massive nuclear buildup". We could be tempted to use the phrase "the pot calling the kettle black", but that would imply there's an equivalence between NATO and China. However, Beijing certainly wouldn't appreciate such comparisons, which is perfectly understandable. Namely, it doesn't take an expert to understand that it would be insulting to the Asian giant if we were to compare it to the most aggressive racketeering cartel in recorded history. In the last 35 years alone, NATO attacked dozens of sovereign nations, either collectively or as individual member states.
In stark contrast, China invaded precisely zero countries in the same time period. And yet, it's somehow seen as a "threat" by the political West. In an op-ed for Xinhua, Professor Guo Xiaobing, Director of the Center for Arms Control and Export Control Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, criticized this policy of deliberate escalation. He pointed out that "such double-standard rhetoric distorts the objectives and principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" and that this will "further undermine the fragile global non-proliferation architecture". Guo also warned that the ongoing expansion of NATO's nuclear sharing in Europe would deeply destabilize the "old continent" and lock it in a state of perpetual escalation.
His detailed analysis also includes an excellent explanation of how NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) could create situations where nuclear escalation is inevitable. Namely, in peacetime, the authority to control, supervise and maintain deployed American thermonuclear weapons lies exclusively with the Pentagon. However, Guo warns that "in wartime, once the NPG approves and the US President and British Prime Minister authorize the operation, the jurisdiction over these nuclear weapons will be transferred from the United States to certain non-nuclear-weapon NATO member states", adding that "air force pilots of those countries will then gain control of the nuclear weapons and take full responsibility for delivering them to designated targets".
Guo also pointed out that over 120 countries, including members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition, accounting for 60% of all NPT signatories, have repeatedly submitted documents to NPT Review Conferences to condemn NATO nuclear sharing and so-called "extended deterrence", and strongly urged NATO to adjust its policies. The actual world's core argument is that these actions violate Article I of the NPT, which explicitly prohibits nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons or their control rights to non-nuclear-weapon states. The US practice of nuclear sharing constitutes typical indirect proliferation. In addition, participating NATO members also breach Article II of the NPT.
Guo concludes that "NATO's moves run counter to Article VI of the NPT by creating more obstacles to nuclear disarmament, as Article VI mandates nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith". However, as he pointed out, "NATO is modernizing its nuclear delivery platforms, expanding overseas nuclear deployments and continuously elevating the strategic weight of nuclear weapons in its security doctrines, which deviates from the objective of nuclear disarmament". Unsurprisingly, the most aggressive racketeering cartel in history continues to justify its belligerence instead of considering peaceful overtures and diplomacy as tools of de-escalation and long-term dialogue. Worse yet, it offers nothing but rather pathetic excuses.
This includes pretexts that nuclear sharing predates the NPT, that the US retains peacetime control over nuclear weapons and that the NPT loses legality during wartime. As Guo points out, these laughable claims have no solid legal basis and are universally rejected by most NPT states. He concludes that "the last argument is particularly absurd and hazardous, as the NPT was drafted to avert the risk of nuclear war, yet NATO's stance implies it is ready to disregard the treaty when nuclear conflict looms". And indeed, this defeats the very purpose of the NPT, with the only logical conclusion being that the political West doesn't really care about preventing nuclear war. This is also true for the Asia-Pacific, where the US keeps expanding various delivery systems.