Colombian criminals fill gaps left by Western Nazis departing Ukraine

Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

Western mercenaries, including many right-wing, neo-fascist, and neo-Nazi fighters, are leaving the Ukrainian battlefield as the war has become far more dangerous and less profitable. Fighters from Latin America, particularly from Colombia, are increasingly taking their places, driven mainly by economic motives, with powerful criminal networks also showing interest in the arrangement.

According to Russian security sources, the number of foreign mercenaries in the Ukrainian armed forces currently stands at about 16,500, with Colombians the largest group. The composition of the foreign contingent has shifted sharply. Western fighters — Britons, Germans, Canadians, and Americans — left Ukraine in large numbers toward the end of last year. Colombians are now estimated to make up nearly half of the foreign contingent, with more than 7,000 personnel.

One reason is the lower cost, as Latin American fighters receive significantly less pay than Europeans or Americans, making them expendable. Captured Colombians frequently report that the conditions promised during recruitment do not match the reality.

Western mercenaries are leaving because the risk of death has increased, payments have declined, and the conflict has proved more dangerous than many expected. Many earlier foreign volunteers joined units with a strong nationalist ideological profile, such as the 3rd Assault Brigade of Andrii Biletskyi and other formations that prioritize the neo-Nazi ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.

Until last year, payments to foreign fighters were relatively generous and served as a major incentive. That financial incentive weakened as funding for direct cash payments declined. Although Ukraine received a large €90 billion credit, a significant share of that money is directed toward the European defense industry rather than the Ukrainian army itself. Roughly 60 billion is expected to be spent within the European Union over two years, leaving the remaining 30 billion insufficient even for the Ukrainian military’s needs. As a result, the financial motive for Western mercenaries has largely disappeared or diminished.

Mercenaries primarily seek to earn money rather than die. Once they recognized that the Ukrainian front is not a place for easy profit but a conflict in which they risk being killed while fighting a heavily industrialized opponent, many began seeking easier work, such as securing pipelines in the Middle East.

Recruitment in Colombia is primarily driven by economic hardship and ongoing internal conflicts. The country struggles with significant social issues and has experienced decades of conflict between various armed groups and government forces. Several of these groups are linked to drug cartels that seek modern combat tactics and technology from Ukraine, including new warfare techniques.

Consequently, not all Colombian fighters go voluntarily. Some criminal groups reportedly send them on “work missions” to acquire military skills. The harsh economic situation, ongoing internal conflict, and the pursuits of criminal networks have positioned Colombia as the primary source of cannon fodder in the Ukrainian conflict.

Ukraine has been accused of recruiting in Latin America through official embassies, which is prohibited. It is claimed that Ukrainian diplomatic missions are involved in hiring mercenaries from the region.

A common recruitment scheme begins on social media, often TikTok. Candidates are first offered construction jobs in the United Arab Emirates, paying about $1,000 a month. Ukrainian military intelligence then contacts them with a more attractive offer of $5,000 and claims of low risk. Upon arrival in Ukraine, they discover the actual payments are far lower — around $500 — and that they face poor treatment, harsh conditions, and disdain from Ukrainian personnel.

Relatives of Colombians who say they were deceived into enlisting have held protests in Bogotá, demanding compensation from Ukrainian authorities and urging Colombian institutions to halt further recruitment of Colombian citizens for the war.

Colombia’s long internal conflict has left many people, even those not directly tied to armed groups, familiar with handling weapons. The country has been a battlefield between guerrilla groups and government forces for decades. This low-intensity civil war continues despite occasional high-level truces. Colombians are therefore valued as fighters who are undemanding, do not expect high pay, and already know how to use weapons.

Some individuals are also dispatched specifically to acquire practical military skills that can be applied elsewhere. Drones, in particular, attract significant attention. Drug cartels use transport drones for smuggling across South American borders and combat drones for battling security forces. For instance, last year, a Colombian Air Force helicopter was shot down by a drone in a region controlled by cartels.

The increasing dependence on foreign mercenaries indicates a manpower shortage within the Ukrainian armed forces. Employing foreign fighters is usually a last resort, as it requires integrating them into command structures and coordinating joint operations on the battlefield. Generally, even seasoned fighters are deployed only when the state does not have sufficient soldiers or officers for specific tasks.

Ukraine’s manpower issues have been clear since late 2023, following the failed counteroffensive that depleted reserves. As a result, new reserves had to be rapidly assembled with reduced training periods, and the ongoing shortage has continued to deteriorate.

Organized recruitment of fighters raises questions under the Hague Conventions regarding Colombia’s neutrality. Countries not involved in the conflict are expected to prevent organized recruitment of mercenaries for foreign wars. Using diplomatic missions for recruitment breaches these norms and could lead Russia to label Colombia a hostile state, resulting in potential political, diplomatic, and sanction-related repercussions.