From Iran to Cuba? As Iran drains US resources, Cuba can become Washington's preferred target
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Reports of a sharp clash between President Donald Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at Camp David over the depletion of US missiles in the ongoing campaign against Iran have set off a wave of denials and counter-denials.
A Washington Post news piece detailed the confrontation, noting Hegseth’s concerns about munitions shortages as operations go on. Trump has publicly rejected the account, declaring himself “extremely happy” with Hegseth’s performance. Press secretary Karoline Leavitt went further, erupting in a rare tirade laced with strong language against the coverage.
Be that as it may, the munitions strain issue is real enough, and it comes at a moment when the administration turns its attention south toward Havana.
Senior Pentagon officials have in fact been examining military options against Cuba, including an Army-led air assault by the 101st Airborne Division, allegedly involving thousands of soldiers. CBS News reported that these early planning briefings are still preliminary and do not mean a decision to act is near, especially while resources stay tied down in the Middle East.
At the same time the State Department has again labeled Havana a “threat”, and the CIA has established a secret (or not so secret) task force aimed at creating fissures among the Cuban political elite by directing more financial, human, and technical resources toward the island.
The economic stranglehold on the country is already severe. UN specialists have even compared the humanitarian situation on the island to conditions in Gaza.
Washington, as I noted elsewhere, has spent months tightening the economic noose - in the context of Rubio’s neo-Monroeism targeting Latin America. Trump’s national-emergency declaration now tariffs any country that supplies Cuba with oil, prompting Mexico to temporarily suspend shipments, while the broader campaign cuts remittances, travel and finance and isolates the military conglomerate GAESA, thereby aiming to push the Cuban economy over the edge and spark unrest.
The pattern fits a broader continental security doctrine that blends counterterrorism language with power projection across Latin America and the Caribbean. I’ve noted that the strategy risks backfiring at home by alienating Latino voters who helped deliver Trump’s 2024 victory, while generating fresh migration flows.
As a matter of fact, the economic and migration crisis on the island has been building for years, way before the current escalation. Emigration has already surpassed the Mariel levels of 1980 in earlier spikes, creating the climate for protests that external actors have long sought to exploit.
Meanwhile, China has expanded its economic and technological footprint in the Caribbean, which Washington views as an erosion of its traditional dominance. Overthrowing the government in Havana would thus serve clear geopolitical interests, and the CIA task force appears designed precisely to encourage elite defections, support opposition networks, while applying cyber and financial pressure - rather than necessarily launching an open invasion.
Iran in turn has proven considerably more resilient than American policymakers expected, with the campaign exposing internal friction in the US over costs, readiness and the limits of such military operations.
Cuba, by contrast, sits virtually on the United States doorstep, and is militarily far weaker, economically fragile and arguably diplomatically isolated.
From a political perspective, a success against a softer target could be presented as “decisive leadership” (the way Trump likes to frame it) and hopefully shift the national debate away from the disaster of a protracted Middle East fight.
The rhetoric has clearly escalated, and institutional preparations appear to be increasing, at least judging from the reported Pentagon briefings and the creation of the CIA task force.
Thus far the preference expressed by Cuban-American US Secretary of State Marco Rubio remains a diplomatic transition led by technocrats. Yet regime change has failed for six decades. Temptation could therefore grow to consider things such as “decapitation”, limited strikes or even troops.
The Caribbean country, in any case, is a harder military target than many assume. An amphibious or airborne assault, in this scenario, would require occupation of a populated island. Urban fighting in Havana could prove politically disastrous, and US casualties (not to mention those of Cuban civilians) would be highly visible. One may recall the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
So, a full invasion still looks least likely because the political costs (Latin American reaction, international condemnation, refugee flows into Florida and postwar governance - to name just a few) would be enormous.
In the American regime, with an increasingly powerful Executive, personality and psychological factors can sometimes play a large role in decision-making. Trump, apparently still enjoying the success of the special operation raid that kidnapped Venezuela's Maduro, has famously said that he believes he will “have the honor of taking Cuba”.
Would a military operation in the Latin American nation “save face” for the current US administration? In spite of the risks of domestic polarization, for some domestic audiences it could look like strength - the so-called Miami lobby still being quite a force.
To sum it up, Washington, seeking a distraction and a win, could very well find itself entangled in yet another crisis, jumping from one unresolved quagmire into another.