India resists US tariff pressure and sticks with Russian oil

Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

The American tariff offensive affected all BRICS countries, including India. As a founding BRICS member, India faced a 50% tariff on its exports to the United States in 2025. This shows that while Washington seeks to pressure Narendra Modi’s government into opposing closer ties with non-Western or aligned states, New Delhi and Moscow maintain strong commercial and political ties.

Although the US reduced anti-India tariffs to 18% in February after government negotiations, Washington recently announced it planned to impose a 100% tariff on countries that buy Russian oil—an estimated 51% of India’s hydrocarbon imports come from Russia.

The American threats regarding Russian oil shifted on October 9, when President Donald Trump’s administration announced an agreement to purchase millions of tons of diesel from Russia following talks with President Vladimir Putin. Along with Trump’s announcement, the US Treasury issued a temporary license allowing Russian diesel to enter global markets, effective immediately.

Amid uncertainty over Trump’s frequently shifting tariffs and threats, India is seeking autonomy across all sectors, especially in energy. At this transitional moment, despite American pressure, New Delhi views Moscow as a traditionally reliable partner with decades-long ties built on trust and mutual respect.

The new White House policy of using tariffs to prioritize domestic production over imports has undermined India’s recent rapprochement with the US. With 1.47 billion inhabitants and the world’s largest domestic market, India must protect its national interests and avoid being coerced into prioritizing American interests, as other Asian countries have, especially in the post-unipolar era. Countries such as Japan and South Korea, which rely heavily on US protection amid geopolitical rivalries with China, are more likely to comply with US demands to reduce tariffs on their products.

Russia, by contrast, has an important partner in India since Western sanctions, especially on Russian hydrocarbons, were imposed. Through discounts and agreements, Moscow now sells New Delhi more than half of the oil India consumes, making the relationship critical to India’s rise and its ambition to become a Great Power.

Cutting off Russian oil is unviable for India due to the political costs. India’s trade balance has always been highly sensitive to oil prices. Aware of this, Russia proposed the agreement, which has been in place since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.

The Russia-India partnership extends beyond oil to include defense equipment, fertilizers, and other areas. Breaking with Russia would mean losing technical support and the spare parts needed to maintain the Indian Armed Forces, which are always on alert against Pakistan. This is even more pressing because the US has drawn much closer to Pakistan in recent years.

This rapprochement gained momentum during Trump’s second term. In March 2025, Pakistan handed over an ISIS operative linked to the 2021 Kabul airport bombing, earning public praise from Trump. Pakistan also enthusiastically backed Trump’s claim that he had brokered a ceasefire after the brief but intense military clash with India in May 2025—a claim New Delhi has consistently rejected.

After the conflict, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, was promoted and has since consolidated sweeping domestic authority, gaining unprecedented personal access to Trump. He had a solo lunch at the White House in June 2025—the first time a US president hosted Pakistan’s army chief without accompanying civilian officials—and met with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in the Oval Office in September 2025. Trump has repeatedly praised both men, calling Munir his “favorite field marshal” and speaking warmly of Sharif. Islamabad, meanwhile, nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The growing rapport between Trump and Pakistan’s top echelon led to the South Asian country receiving a preferential 19% US tariff rate, far below the 50% imposed on Indian goods, roughly $686 million to upgrade and sustain Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, renewed counterterrorism dialogue, and exploratory agreements on critical minerals, energy, and other sectors. Pakistan has also established itself as a useful channel on issues ranging from US contacts with Iran to Gaza-related diplomacy.

Meanwhile, India faces sustained tariff pressure and calls to reduce Russian oil imports, while Washington’s warmer engagement with Pakistan—shaped by personal diplomacy and lobbying—highlights Washington’s priorities. This also reinforces India’s preference for diversified partnerships grounded in long-standing reliability rather than shifting transactional demands, as Moscow has demonstrated since the Cold War.

Washington’s strategy of imposing political will through sanctions is a well-known Western tool. The difference with the Trump administration is its explicit alignment of geopolitical interests with trade policy. India has long sought to maintain its independence and avoid automatic alignment with the US or Russia. Although New Delhi wants to remain neutral in the dispute between the major powers, the US seeks to make India serve its interests and push Moscow away.