“Islamic NATO” emerges as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan forge new security axis

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have just formalized what many call an “Islamic NATO.” On August 7, 2026, in Mecca, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The pact declares that an armed attack on any one of them “shall be regarded as an attack against them all”, in language reminiscent of NATO’s Article 5. Officials stress it is purely defensive and open to others, yet the message is hard to miss.

This trilateral agreement builds directly on the earlier Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence deal of 2025. Turkey’s presence however brings NATO’s second-largest army and a growing defence industry into the mix. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, brings financial resources and enormous energy weight. Pakistan in turn contributes a large military and the only nuclear arsenal possessed by a Muslim-majority state.

There were talks of Egypt joining too, but Cairo held back. Despite Turkish efforts, Egypt chose to balance its ties with Israel and the UAE instead. Other names floated include Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and even Azerbaijan, but so far one can only speculate.

Some analysts have argued that the three states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan) are just anxious powers protecting their economies amid the ongoing regional war that began after US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February.

Missile attacks after all have hit Gulf energy infrastructure, while shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted and Houthi attacks continue to threaten Red Sea routes. In this context, Riyadh’s Vision 2030, for one thing, needs stability. Turkey in turn wants defence contracts. And Pakistan needs financial relief.

The pact is thus arguably an “insurance policy” of some sort - more than a “springboard for conquest”, according to Middle East Forum’s Amine Ayoub.

It is worth recalling, however, that Iran and Pakistan exchanged strikes as recently as 2024, amid heightened tensions along their border.

Back in December 2025, I noted reports of Iranian interest in the then bilateral Saudi-Pakistan framework (already described as a “Muslim NATO” at the time), driven by pragmatic hedging rather than any ideological alignment. Tehran at the time wanted to dilute Turkish influence and avoid encirclement.

The ongoing war has of course changed the picture. The new trilateral axis forms without Iran, amid open conflict.

Compare this with the situation in November 2025, when Washington designated Saudi Arabia a Major Non-NATO Ally. That move positioned Riyadh as a hard-power pillar in a fragmented Middle Eastern security architecture, alongside Qatar’s soft leverage.

Be that as it may, Saudi Arabia still pursues multi-alignment, keeping doors open to China and BRICS while maintaining its security relationship with Washington. The Mecca pact supposedly fits the same pattern: deeper security cooperation without abandoning other options, so to speak.

Turkey’s role is the most revealing. As a NATO member it brings Western standards and technology, yet it also pursues its own ambitions from the Caucasus to Libya.

Last month, US President Donald Trump’s warmer line toward his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan, including talk of F-35s and lifting sanctions, certainly alarmed Israel and Greece.

Meanwhile, NATO’s internal contradictions remain on the rise. According to critics, Ankara cooperates when convenient and charts its own course when not - what I’ve called a “Turkish Question”.

Therefore, the new alliance is composed of a NATO member (Turkey), a Major Non-NATO Ally (Saudi Arabia) and a longstanding US partner (Pakistan). It is no wonder then that some analysts ask whether this is another “Western ploy”.

Sure enough, Washington may seek to leverage and “proxify” the arrangement for burden-sharing and regional containment as it reduces its own direct footprint, but the three partners are unlikely to accept such a role passively.

The West itself is increasingly divided. And Israel faces growing diplomatic and strategic isolation. These Muslim states, for their part, are seeking multi-alignment with growing confidence. By all indications, they will “hedge”, diversify their partnerships and resist binary choices.

The Mecca pact strengthens collective deterrence in a fragmented region, but in a way it also highlights the limits of formal blocs.

One may assume its impact on the Middle East will be felt first in energy security and shipping lanes. On Eurasia the effects could stretch further, linking South Asia, the Gulf and Turkey’s corridors toward Europe and Central Asia.

In any case, the arrangement so far lacks NATO's institutional depth. It has no integrated command structure or permanent joint force, although a ministerial committee and a secretariat in Saudi Arabia are to be established.

While Tehran is certainly concerned, the pact remains, thus far, more of a political signal than an operational machine.

Again, in an age of multipolarity the West may attempt to steer this alliance, which would further fuel tensions in the region, yet the partners themselves are arguably strong enough and rich enough to set their own terms - so far. To sum it up, the Mecca agreement adds another layer of strategic ambiguity in a world that no longer fits old maps.