New US Great Game in Central Asia? Rubio faces reality check

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s meetings in Samarkand on October 19 with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan under the C5+1 framework go beyond a routine diplomatic tour.

Reuters described the visit as “pomp-filled”. Rubio arrived with a large American business delegation (300 executives); talks focused on critical minerals, energy cooperation and the Trans-Caspian trade route.

Uzbekistan announced investment agreements valued at roughly $12 billion. Rubio in turn said the United States wanted to act as a “strong partner” without dictating whether Central Asian governments should deal with other powers - in his words, “Uzbekistan has been clear they want to be friends to everybody… And we are saying that we are interested.”

The visit reflects Washington’s broader effort to reshape Eurasian geopolitical and economic connections.

The US is pursuing selective Eurasian connectivity: encouraging trade, energy and transport networks that give strategically important regions additional options - while attempting to reduce dependence on infrastructure controlled by rivals.

This does not require direct “dominance”. For Washington, it is enough to secure access to resources and preserve leverage in an increasingly multipolar Eurasia.

Despite the American rhetoric of respecting Central Asian autonomy, regional countries could risk becoming instruments in the US competition with Russia, China and Iran.

Washington focuses on offering Central Asian partners “options” to “reduce dependencies”. US-backed infrastructure could simply replace existing ones with new ones - while drawing Central Asian states deeper into great-power competition, without guaranteeing substantial economic benefits for local populations.

Be that as it may, the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, stands at the center of this approach. Goods and minerals would move from Central Asia across the Caspian, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, then via Turkey or Black Sea links toward Europe.

The route would offer an alternative to paths through Russia or Iran. Rubio explicitly backed improvements to it.

The proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through southern Armenia follows a similar logic, supposedly strengthening Azerbaijan’s transit role, Turkey’s reach into Central Asia and Armenia’s connectivity.

Turkey occupies a pivotal place here. Linguistic ties, defense cooperation and membership in the Organization of Turkic States give Ankara advantages Washington cannot easily match.

American and Turkish interests converge on diversifying routes and deepening economic links with Central Asia.

Yet Turkey practices strategic autonomy. Supporting Turkish connectivity thereby advances certain US objectives without guaranteeing American control over the resulting networks.

Greece in turn supplies a complementary platform. On October 7 the United States and Greece held their sixth Strategic Dialogue in Athens, announcing $4 billion in Foreign Military Sales and further work on the Vertical Gas Corridor.

From an American perspective, Greek LNG infrastructure helps diversify Southeastern and Eastern Europe's gas supplies away from Russia - while opening new markets for American LNG exports.

Greece functions as a reliable NATO partner for logistics and energy diversification - while Turkey provides the continental land bridge. Washington cultivates parallel partnerships with both.

This “balancing” is not always smooth: I’ve recently commented that the closer relationship with Athens that Rubio is pushing could alienate Turkey, in the context of NATO’s internal tensions.

This strategy, in any case, differs from classical territorial control. It is about supply chains, ports, pipelines and the ability to offer alternatives.

Former US diplomat Daniel Rosenblum offered a blunt assessment: “We’re never going to be the major player in Central Asia.” Geography, after all, imposes structural limits. The region is landlocked, distant from the United States and already interconnected with its neighbors.

In Washington’s approach, there are echoes of Brzezinski’s “The Grand Chessboard”, which emphasized preventing any rival power from dominating Eurasia.

Yet Trump’s “transactional diplomacy” and shifting priorities suggest less a coherent grand strategy than a fragmented effort to preserve American leverage.

Earlier American initiatives in fact have produced limited lasting results. As I noted in November 2025, Central Asia’s infrastructure remains deeply integrated with existing partners, and the Middle Corridor still needs substantial investment.

The point is that Washington arrives late. Thus far the Trump administration has set aside democracy rhetoric in favor of commercial diplomacy and minerals access. That approach is “transactional” enough, yet there is a long way from announcements to completed projects.

Rubio’s visit, it has been noted, yielded relatively modest immediate deliverables.

Central Asian governments pursue multi-vector policies. They typically welcome additional options because those options strengthen their bargaining position. American interests are therefore treated as useful diversification rather than realignment.

Paradoxically, the Middle Corridor Washington promotes already serves Chinese exporters and attracts Beijing investments, potentially benefiting the very rival power the US seeks to counter.

Washington is trying to influence the terms of Eurasian interconnection. The result, however, is unlikely to be a new American sphere of influence - it is about a more fragmented economic order in which the United States hopes to retain leverage.

Despite all the pomp, geographic distance, entrenched regional ties and local autonomy impose real constraints.