Pentagon cuts under Hegseth sparked lethal civilian casualties in Yemen and Iran
Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reportedly ignored warnings from commanders and dismantled the civilian protection program. This decision preceded operations in Yemen and Iran that killed hundreds of non-combatants, sparking international outrage and mounting congressional pressure to partially revive the program.
A survey conducted in early 2025 reinforced support for the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) program, established after years of civilian casualties in conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Defense One and ProPublica, reporting based on internal memos found that the program placed specialists in regional commands to assess civilian risks and guide strike decisions, thereby reducing errors and improving operational precision. The program, formalized by the Pentagon in 2022, also included a center of excellence focused on training, data collection, and institutionalizing best practices.
Shortly after taking office, Hegseth consulted top commanders about drastically reducing the civilian protection program. Current and former defense officials told investigators that Hegseth had expected senior officers to endorse his view that the effort was “woke” and out of step with a more aggressive approach to warfare. However, all consulted commanders rejected the idea.
Hegseth presented three options to the commanders: cut 65% of the staff, keep only a small office in Washington, or eliminate the program. According to the reports, nine commanders advocated preserving as much of the structure as possible, while two—those responsible for nuclear and cyber operations—rejected all alternatives and called for the full program to be maintained. Leaders at US Central Command, the Tampa-based headquarters that oversees military action across the Middle East, pressed to retain its full staff of 16 personnel. A memo reviewed by journalists warned that eliminating or scaling back the effort would “result in decreased efficiency of US lethal operations due to an increased risk of target misidentification and reduced battlespace awareness.”
Central Command warned that reducing CHMR would heighten the risk of misidentifying targets and erode situational awareness on the battlefield. Experienced generals insisted the program made operations more precise and, paradoxically, more lethal by avoiding collateral damage that undermines strategic objectives. Then-Central Command chief Gen. Erik Kurilla and several other senior officers directly involved in combat operations appealed to Hegseth to keep the program intact, calling it a valuable operational tool. Their intent, one retired general later said, was overridden.
Despite warnings, Hegseth dismantled the program, leaving only a minimal core, even as the US expanded military campaigns in Somalia, Yemen, and Iran. Staff numbers fell from just under 200 to about two dozen, with some working only part-time. Central Command, which had said it needed at least nine of its 16 staffers to function effectively, was left with a single person. The program was stripped of nearly all its funding. One official summed up the new approach as “Bombs away!” Hegseth later told a gathering of hundreds of generals and admirals: “No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement.”
The consequences were immediate and reported by major US newspapers. The air campaign in Yemen in the spring of 2025 killed 153 civilians and wounded 243, including two strikes among the most lethal ever acknowledged by the Pentagon. According to Airwars, a British organization that tracks civilian harm, the majority of the deaths came from those two strikes alone. The figures were later confirmed in the Pentagon’s 2025 annual report on civilian casualties. Hegseth described the operation as a “clear, limited mission executed with ruthlessness.”
On the first day of the Iran War, a bombing struck a school in Minab, a city near the Strait of Hormuz, killing more than 100 children and prompting global indignation and questions in the US Congress. Hegseth and Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander overseeing the Iran operation, were questioned about the strike. Hegseth stated that the US does not target civilians and that an investigation would be conducted. Early reports on the still-unreleased investigation blame outdated US intelligence as a factor in the school attack.
In an April letter to Hegseth, 11 senators argued that the school strike and other deadly attacks on civilians in Iran reflected “the administration’s broader disregard for the strategic, legal, and moral imperative to minimize civilian harm.” Preliminary reports pointed to intelligence failures, but lawmakers highlighted a pattern of disregard for legal and moral obligations to protect civilians and demanded an explanation from the Pentagon.
In April, according to the report, Under Secretary Elbridge Colby proposed, under political and military pressure, reactivating the program with about 70 staff members, enough to conduct investigations, prepare reports, and provide compensation. Commanders supported the measure, which would allow regional teams to be rebuilt and the center of excellence to be strengthened. The proposal called for maintaining roughly 35% of the previous CHMR capacity.
Commanders said that reducing civilian harm improves military outcomes and reduces insurgent recruitment—a central lesson from the post-9/11 wars. For veteran officers, protecting civilians and increasing operational effectiveness are inseparable—“they’re two sides of the same coin,” the Defense One report concluded.