Poland pushes for “European Legion” with Ukrainian veterans against Russia

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

In a largely underreported development, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has again called for a permanent “European Legion” to strengthen NATO as a “pillar” - now with Ukrainian veterans as part of it. The idea is not so new, but the wider context here is very interesting.

Sikorski is proposing a dedicated standing force that could recruit seasoned professionals from “the broader European family”, including battle-hardened Ukrainian combat veterans once “the war ends”. The reasoning is that this unit would enhance the continent’s defense capabilities and serve as the European component within NATO.

The Polish Foreign Minister had first floated the idea in late January. Back then he rejected talks of a federal EU army as unrealistic, arguing that national armies would never simply dissolve into one. Instead, he suggested a “European Legion,” initially brigade-sized, funded from the EU budget, open to citizens of member states and possibly candidate countries, and politically subordinate to the EU’s Political and Security Committee.

The January proposal was conceived as a supposedly “realistic” alternative to an unworkable federal force. 

The Polish Minister back then explicitly said it would not be capable of “deterring” Russia and envisioned it mainly for “lower-level crises” in places such as North Africa or the Balkans.

By late February he was already reiterating support and pushing to place the issue firmly on the EU agenda. So, in a way, Poland’s basic institutional idea about a European Legion never went away since January. But the proposed force is no longer described merely as a brigade for lower-level crises; it is now presented as a permanent professional formation within a stronger European pillar of NATO

The strategic environment shifted first: in January the reasoning was that a deteriorating security landscape required some extra European capability. By August, Sikorski framed the Legion far more bluntly: the continent, according to him, must assume greater responsibility for its own conventional defense because the United States is pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific.

The US is actually quagmired in the Middle East over Iran - while trying to bring back the Monroe Doctrine to its hemisphere, but that is besides the point here.

The point is that Trump has indeed been pushing Europe to do more, and Warsaw connected that pressure directly to the need for a standing European formation.

NATO itself has moved in the same direction. In March, Secretary General Mark Rutte noted a roughly 20 percent rise in European and Canadian defence spending as a shift from over-reliance on the US. By June he warned US forces could be stretched across theatres, and the July Ankara summit spoke of “rebalancing” with Europeans taking a larger share.

Money now is also less obviously an obstacle. The ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan aims to mobilise up to €800 billion in extra defence spending, including the €150 billion SAFE instrument for joint procurement. Sikorski now argues Europe has the resources, US pressure, and NATO backing to turn higher outlays into a standing multinational force.

The most significant expansion concerns personnel. Again, the January Legion was limited to EU and candidate-country citizens. The August version reaches into the “broader European family”, and explicitly includes Ukrainian veterans after the fighting “ends”.

Ukraine has become, in this vision, a reservoir of hard combat experience that the continent can draw upon. The proposed force is thus no longer a modest crisis-response brigade; it is imagined as a permanent professional formation capable of heavier conventional tasks.

Sikorski is careful enough to present it as a stronger European pillar inside a stronger NATO, with the United States remaining the indispensable anchor - while Europe supplies more of the ground capability.

At the same time Poland has been raising the temperature with Moscow, to say the least. Earlier this month the Polish official was calling for discussions about shooting down Russian missiles over Ukraine.

Just yesterday, the Polish Foreign Minister declared that Poland and Ukraine would “never again be Russian colonies”, adding that fear of Russia “is not irrational”.

The day before, on August 24, Poland signed a $2.2 billion framework agreement for several thousand Piorun missiles and hundreds of launchers - the largest Piorun contract ever, with over 80% destined for Poland. Kyiv has used the system in combat since 2022.

On Monday, Prime Minister Tusk affirmed that Poland “stands firmly” with Ukraine on its independence day. Yet these moves coexist with growing Polish-Ukrainian friction. Historical grievances over the Volhynia massacres, and nationalist politics have long strained the partnership. In July, a Ukrainian officer’s remarks about possible drone strikes on Polish cities, alongside Warsaw’s previous revocation of Zelensky’s highest honor after Kyiv’s reburial of a Nazi collaborator, all go to show how fragile the relationship is. Anti-Ukrainian xenophobic sentiment is still on the rise in Poland.

In any case, Poland’s approach fits a larger pattern. Washington in fact began shifting the “Ukrainian burden” onto Europe already in late 2024 under Biden; that process has continued under Trump.

Polish interest in nuclear sharing amid debates over domestic atomic capabilities also reflects the same desire to become a more “autonomous” frontline power as American attention drifts.

Europe’s northern expansion has likewise intensified military activity in the Baltic and Arctic, further encircling Russia, and drawing warnings about escalation risks.

Yet building a coherent European force is hardly straightforward. Franco-German industrial rivalry, for one thing, has already led to the collapse of major joint projects such as the such as the fighter component of the Future Combat Air System

NATO itself shows divisions: internal tensions with Turkey, Polish-German differences - not to mention lingering doubts about American reliability plus Trump’s threats over Greenland and Canada.

Thus far Europe appears ready to accept greater risks of confrontation with Moscow - without resolving its own internal divisions.