Red Sea becomes new Hormuz with Saudi-Houthi tensions as Saudi Arabia entering Iranian war

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis are rising once more, raising the risk that conflict-hit Yemen becomes further drawn into the wider Middle East confrontation now centered on Iran.

Recent military exchanges have broken the relative “peace” that followed the 2022 truce (even as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping had already intensified from late 2023 in response to the Gaza war).

On Tuesday, the Houthi rebels claimed a drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s Najran Airport, describing it as a response to alleged Saudi drone violations of Yemeni airspace over Saada and Hajjah.

Saudi forces, for their part, appear to be concentrating for a possible sea and land offensive in central Yemen aimed at reducing the restrictions on oil exports through the southern Red Sea.

The Saudi authorities have also taken steps to form a multinational maritime defense coalition involving 14 countries to protect shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Houthi threats and attacks on Saudi-linked vessels and facilities, including Aramco sites.

This escalation comes as the broader US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, which began with strikes in late February, continues to reshape the region. Riyadh, which had been engaged in talks with Tehran, has now found itself drawn in, even joining American forces in strikes on infrastructure used by Iranian-backed groups in Iraq.

Analysts such as Elfadil Ibrahim have noted that the Houthis, part of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”, are using the wider war to press unresolved demands on Saudi Arabia, such as fully lifting remaining blockades.

Be as it may, the Houthis retain their own Yemeni priorities and their own agency (being a force to be reckoned with), even as they express solidarity with Iran. Here some context is needed.

Already in early 2024, the US was unable to halt the Houthi Red Sea campaign. Washington in fact admitted its airstrikes were not stopping the attacks and even asked its rival China to pressure Iran into restraining the rebels.

The root cause then, as now, lay in the American superpower enabling Israeli actions in Gaza, which fueled the regional spillover. China had little incentive to overuse its leverage, viewing the crisis as tied to that broader conflict.

Moreover, even as an emerging power, the Persian nation does not exercise absolute command over groups such as the Houthis. These “proxy” movements retain their own constituencies, interests, and decision-making processes despite receiving Iranian support. And the Israel-Palestine issue remains polarizing enough and continues to drive these dynamics.

Considering this complex picture, I argued as early as July 2022 that an Iran-Israel war was becoming increasingly likely - the current crisis reflects a broader context. The Iran-Israel “shadow war” since then gradually expanded into the Red Sea, while the failure of the US project in Iraq strengthened Tehran's regional position.

Throughout 2024, a “stuck” Washington proved unable to restore effective deterrence despite repeated strikes on Iranian-backed groups. Moreover, attacks on American positions alongside the Red Sea crisis highlighted the Islamic Republic's rising influence stretching from the Levant to one of the world's most strategic maritime corridors.

By August 2024, a pattern had become unmistakable: Israeli actions risked igniting a wider regional war, while the US remained deeply involved without containing its principal rival.

Today, the Saudi-Houthi clashes remain contained thus far, yet the risks of a return to full conflict in Yemen are very real, with the population still facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Any new round would likely end as before: costly for both sides and eventually requiring talks.

The point is that the current tensions form part of a larger pattern. The main drivers of today’s Middle East crisis lie in long-standing US support that has enabled Israeli irredentist policies in Palestine, combined with American sanctions and interventions.

The failed US-led nation-building project in Iraq stands out: rather than containing Tehran, it ultimately left the Persian country as the dominant regional power - a reality that Trump appears to have underestimated. The consequences of that continue to shape events from the Levant to the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia’s recent contacts with Iran indicated a preference for de-escalation, yet the expanding war is pulling actors in unexpected directions. Managing these pressures would require recognizing the autonomy of local groups and pressuring Israel into stopping what many have described as (US-funded) genocide. Meanwhile, the global economy faces blockades in Hormuz and the specter of the Red Sea as a potential new Hormuz.