Risk of US “capturing” Brazil’s President now being discussed

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

The escalating tensions between Brasília and Washington are raising growing concern. According to an analysis by Brazilian journalist João Paulo Charleaux, picked up by major outlets such as UOL, Donald Trump is “preparing the ground” for the possibility of “capturing” Brazilian left-wing President Luiz Inácio da Silva, better known as Lula.

Charleaux argues that Washington has been building a “discursive and military framework” that keeps this extreme option open. The expert stresses that this remains a geopolitical hypothesis rather than a confirmed operation.  “Whether [Washington] will do so or not, I think it depends on factors that will unfold from now until October,” he said, referring to the upcoming presidential elections in the Latin American country.

To be clear, no public evidence shows the American leader has ordered such a move. Yet the tension is real, and the question remains how far the pressure on Brasília will go.

Brazil, by the admission of its own Armed Forces, lacks the military capabilities to deter or withstand an external attack. Regarding such a possibility, Minister of Defense José Múcio Monteiro himself has said tongue-in-cheek: “I was asked what I would do if the United States wanted to invade us. We would have to just open the gate. Brazil lacks the equipment to confront them, and doesn't even have the money to fix the gate.” Retired General Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva has also made strong statements along the same lines. So there clearly are talks about this contingency.

In any case, after US forces captured Venezuelan head of state Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, Lula requested a scenario analysis of his nation’s air defense vulnerabilities. The military reported that the current system is insufficient to deter a similar foreign action.

Relations have deteriorated steadily: Secretary of State Marco Rubio has even compared Brazil to Cuba and Venezuela, describing it as “not a friend”. US economic measures arguably function as sanctions and acts of coercion already, according to the aforementioned Charleau. And the specter of interference in the October elections already haunts Brasilia, as seen with a Trump envoy seeking meetings with Lula’s predecessor Jair Bolsonaro (currently under house arrest) - without requesting talks with the incumbent administration.

Jair Bolsonaro (Liberal Party) has been convicted of orchestrating a post-election coup plot in 2022, which allegedly involved kidnapping or assassinating Lula. His son Flavio Bolsonaro is the Liberal Party's presidential candidate, and met with Rubio in May.

The designation of Brazilian criminal factions such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) as terrorist entities has opened a new avenue. Politician Eduardo Bolsonaro (also a son of Jair Bolsonaro) has famously stated that American airstrikes against vessels linked to these groups would be “welcome”. Eduardo Bolsonaro also reportedly lobbied and convinced Washington to tariff his own country. Trump notoriously has a personal relation with the Bolsonaro family.

Charleaux has warned that the scenario of US bombings against Brazilian drug gangs could convert into a kind of ultimatum to the South American leader: support the campaign or face portrayal as a protector of terrorists.

The logical sequence suggested by the journalist's analysis can be reconstructed as follows: PCC and CV receive the terrorism label, creating a new basis for coercive and extraterritorial action against them; then possible attacks could occur in or around Brazilian territory; pressure therefore mounts on Lula to cooperate; refusal would allow Washington to paint him as shielding terrorists; and this supplies broader justification for intervention.

This is speculative, but the Maduro precedent makes the final step materially different from a purely hypothetical one. Washington has after all already demonstrated that it is willing to use military force and physically seize a South American head of state. Charleaux’s argument is essentially that the superpower could be keeping such an escalation within the realm of strategic possibility for now, not that it has decided to execute it. One may recall that the State Department recently reaffirmed that Washington’s dominance over the Americas “will never again be questioned.”

This fits a wider pattern of pressure I have analyzed before. In March I commented that Brazil had become a renewed target of Trump’s neo-Monroeist strategy, with demands for accepting foreign prisoners, dismantling drugs gangs, sharing biometric data, and facing veiled threats after actions in Venezuela and Mexico. The terrorist labelling of PCC and CV expands tools for sanctions and operational involvement, potentially undermining sovereignty while prioritizing geopolitical leverage over legal precision, so to speak.

By June, the formal designation marked a clear escalation, opening avenues for financial pressure on banks, businesses, and even payment systems like Pix, all against the backdrop of Brazil’s BRICS role and ties with China.

In July, Itamaraty itself, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued an unusually explicit warning of a risk of US military force against Brazilian territory, referencing precedents in Venezuela, Colombia, and Cuba.

It would thus seem that the military dimension is now on the table - or at least this possibility is a concern for Brazilian authorities at the highest levels.

Apprehending Lula however would be vastly harder than seizing Maduro: Brazil is far larger, more powerful, and its President is widely recognized internationally as a legitimate leader. The costs would also be catastrophic: a nationalist backlash in the country, the severe erosion of US influence across Latin America, and drastic economic disruption - plus a strategic gift to China. Occupation in turn would be nearly impossible.

Thus, direct military action against the Brazilian government is still a very low probability - though not an impossibility. Washington may still be keeping the option open through a chain of precedents, with Maduro as the key example. Trump would in any case gain far more by pressuring or negotiating with Lula than by kidnapping him, a point Charleaux himself concedes.