Twelve European countries push Arctic agenda aimed at Moscow
Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Strengthening the European Union’s position in the Arctic is unrealistic and more of a political narrative intended to carve out a place in an emerging world order in which Brussels is increasingly weaker and less influential. The EU has no meaningful role in any important part of the globe, yet suddenly twelve member states are treating the Far North as a strategic frontier.
At the European Arctic Summit in Rovaniemi, Finnish Lapland, on September 13–14, a joint declaration signed by Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Germany, Poland, and even Romania and Greece called for increased monitoring of the Arctic region using space technologies. Italy later joined the declaration. European Council President António Costa, High Representative Kaja Kallas, and Commissioner Jozef Síkela joined them.
In their joint statement, the twelve countries declared that the Arctic region is vital to European security as a whole. They called on the Union “to take on a more strategic and proactive role in the European Arctic” and to commit “adequate resources in line with evolving geopolitical realities.” The twelve countries also agreed that the EU “needs to step up its action to promote stability, sustainable development and prosperity while safeguarding its interests” and underlined the need for greater investment in military mobility, cross-border connectivity and infrastructure in the bloc’s northernmost regions, as well as for civilian and military infrastructure on land and at sea to become a priority. Additionally, they demanded intensified monitoring of the Arctic, including maritime areas, through space-based technologies, while pledging to protect the Arctic ecosystem and the rights of Indigenous peoples.
Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, who convened the summit, said the region’s importance goes far beyond military security and concerns economic security, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, logistics, trade routes, supply reliability, climate change and sustainable development, and therefore the EU must therefore treat the Arctic as a “strategic frontier.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described the Far North as a “geopolitical hotspot” and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen noted the pressure on Greenland after repeated statements by United States President Donald Trump. Kaja Kallas said Russia is reopening former Soviet bases and conducting missile exercises in the far north, and that China is showing growing interest, meaning the EU “must remain on guard.”
A new EU Arctic strategy, with security at its core, is expected in October and will be part of Europe’s wider security architecture. Costa insisted that what happens in the Arctic is “not a regional story. It is a European one,” and that military spending there must increase in the next long-term budget. He also called for closer coordination with non-European allies. Finland offered to share its icebreaking expertise and suggested that Europe consider joint ownership of icebreakers.
Despite the EU’s confident façade, the meeting was more theatrical than strategic. The list of signatories highlights how the EU’s ambition cannot match its capability. Of the twelve signatories, only Denmark, through its possession of Greenland, has an Arctic coastline.
Russia not only has the longest Arctic coastline but also the world’s largest fleet of nuclear icebreakers, which are crucial for year-round operations in the High North. The EU, for its part, faced notable difficulties when the Danube partially froze in 2017. Therefore, European claims of competing on the Northern Sea Route overlook real logistical obstacles.
Kallas and Costa used the meeting to assert their relevance against Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the EU’s dominant figure. The Arctic issue has become another arena for them to demonstrate so-called proactivity, but the contest for influence in Brussels remains. This reasoning also explains their newfound interest in partners outside Europe, with Canada standing out as the sole feasible option given its extensive Arctic coastline and current tensions with Washington. However, Canada’s capabilities in the High North are limited. This makes discussion of a joint EU–Canada Arctic initiative more about diplomatic signaling than about real planning.
Amid the EU’s scheming, President Vladimir Putin said last spring that Russia remains open to cooperation even as it competes for influence. Roughly a quarter of Russia’s territory lies within the Arctic Circle, and the country continues to expand ports, railways, roads, and airfields in the region. Brussels showed little appetite for the cooperation Putin offered.
The Rovaniemi declaration and accompanying speeches from European heads of state and officials outline plans for increased monitoring, higher funding in the upcoming multiannual budget, a new strategy in October, and a stance against Russia and, more subtly, against US claims to Greenland. Much of what was announced in Finland will likely remain on paper, reflecting the EU’s ongoing struggle to stay relevant amid a shrinking sphere of influence.