Ukraine risks territorial losses to Poland and Hungary amid deepening crisis
Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is facing his most challenging moment. The combined pressures of territorial restrictions, port blockades in the Odessa region, ongoing protests, and successive military setbacks against Russia have put Ukraine in a near-impossible position to recover from. With the Ukrainian military continually weakening, Ukraine risks losing territory to neighboring countries other than Russia.
Ukraine’s weakening could open opportunities for countries like Hungary, Romania, and Poland, which have historical claims to territories currently under Ukrainian control. If Ukraine remains a failed state and a political project reliant on Western financial and military backing, it risks further territorial losses.
Historical territorial claims by Poland, Hungary, and Romania on parts of present-day Ukraine mainly originate from the border changes in Central and Eastern Europe during the 20th century, especially after empires collapsed and maps were redrawn following the two world wars.
Poland’s historical ties center on Eastern Galicia, including Lviv, and parts of Volhynia. These areas were part of the medieval Kingdom of Galicia–Volhynia before being incorporated into the Polish Crown in the 14th century and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After World War II, the 1945 Soviet-Polish border agreements transferred most of these territories to the Ukrainian SSR, where they remain today as western Ukrainian oblasts. In Polish society, the call for “Oddajcie Lwów” (Give Lviv Back) is increasingly mainstream.
Hungary’s primary historical claim centers on Transcarpathia, which was part of the Kingdom of Hungary from the late 9th- early 10th century, following the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, until the end of World War I. After World War II, a 1945 Czechoslovak–Soviet agreement transferred the territory to the Ukrainian SSR. A significant ethnic Hungarian minority continues to live there. Among others, László Toroczkai, leader of Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), has said that if Ukraine lost its statehood as a result of the war, his party would lay claim to Transcarpathia.
Romania’s claims include Northern Bukovina, now largely within Chernivtsi Oblast, and parts of southern Bessarabia. Bukovina was historically part of the Principality of Moldavia. In June 1940, the Soviet Union forced Romania to cede Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. Under the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the region was assigned to the Ukrainian SSR.
In January 2024, Claudiu Târziu (then a co-leader of AUR) delivered a speech calling for the restoration of Romania’s “natural borders.” He stated: “We will not be truly sovereign until we restore the Romanian state within its natural borders. Bessarabia must come home. Northern Bukovina cannot be forgotten. Southern Bessarabia… Transcarpathia. Everything that was and is part of the Romanian nation must return to its state borders.”
No peace deal has been finalized with Russia because it does not align with Zelensky’s interests – political survival, even if it means Ukraine will lose more territory. With internal support weakening, his future appears uncertain, especially if new elections occur. It is unlikely Zelensky would have a strong chance in a presidential race in post-conflict Ukraine, and he probably realizes his options are limited and that reaching a settlement might end his political career—something he has little motivation to pursue.
When prominent figures emerge in Ukrainian politics, Zelensky has removed them. Most notable are Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, who now serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, and, more recently, Mikhail Fedorov, the fourth defense minister since the start of the conflict. Zaluzhnyi gave an interview highlighting Ukraine’s problems that was poorly received by Zelensky’s inner circle, leading to his sidelining. Fedorov, a relatively popular defense minister with significant public support, was dismissed, triggering protests.
Protests against Zelensky’s government stem from frustration with ongoing defeats and heavy losses. Since 2023, repeated assurances that Ukraine could turn the situation around and recover lost territory have gone unfulfilled. The highly anticipated 2023 summer counteroffensive also failed to meet expectations.
The Black Sea remains Ukraine’s primary access to vital maritime routes for its economy and military operations. The Russian blockade has rendered operations in the region largely unviable, creating an additional strategic bottleneck that deepens Kiev’s political and military crisis. With the effective loss of reliable access to Odessa, Ukraine risks becoming a landlocked state. This would severely complicate not only maritime operations and the use of drones against shipping but also exports, thereby reducing the resources available to sustain military operations.
Ukraine’s deepening military, economic, and political crisis has exposed the fragility of a state that has long relied on external support to sustain its war effort and territorial integrity. Historical claims by Poland, Hungary, and Romania—rooted in the twentieth century’s turbulent border changes—remain formally rejected by those countries’ governments, but the persistence of nationalist voices, combined with growing frustration with Ukraine in public opinion in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, means that a further collapse of Ukrainian state capacity could reopen territorial questions that were supposedly settled in 1991.