Who Governs Food Security Now? Why Beijing’s Answer Matters Most

By Genevieve Donnellon-May

Who governs global food security when the world’s traditional guarantor steps back — and no single actor fully replaces it?

Three events over the past 18 months have made that question increasingly urgent. At the 2024 BRICS summit, Russia secured endorsement — including from Chinese President Xi Jinping — for a proposed BRICS Grain Exchange aimed at developing alternative agricultural trading arrangements. In 2025, the US froze nearly all foreign food aid, weakening its longstanding role in humanitarian assistance. More recently, China elevated food security in its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) while making it a priority of its 2026 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) chairmanship.

These developments signal that global food governance is no longer anchored in a single multilateral architecture but is increasingly dispersed across overlapping institutions, regional frameworks, minilateral initiatives and bilateral partnerships.

China sits at the centre of this evolving landscape. As the world’s largest agricultural importer, it has a structural interest in stable, open and resilient food systems while simultaneously pursuing bilateral arrangements that strengthen its own supply security. Few countries operate across as many layers of contemporary food governance — from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) to ASEAN, BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and APEC.

Ahead of the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November 2026, the central question is not who replaces the US, but whether China will use its unique cross-layer position to strengthen coordination — or allow fragmentation to define the emerging global food order.

From multilateral consensus to fragmented governance

For much of the post-World War II period, global food security rested on a broadly coherent multilateral architecture. Institutions such as the FAO, United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), CFS and World Trade Organization (WTO) collectively linked humanitarian relief, agricultural development and rules-based trade, reflecting a shared assumption that food security was best managed through international cooperation rather than geopolitical competition.

That consensus is now under strain. The Trump administration’s dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and withdrawal from foreign food assistance in 2025 signalled not simply reduced humanitarian funding, but a retreat from the political leadership that had long underpinned the system.

The consequences are visible. According to WFP, the agency raised US$6.5 billion last year — a 33% slump from US$9.8 billion in 2024 — forcing major reductions in emergency operations from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the same time, development institutions including the World Bank and IFAD face growing funding constraints.

The result is institutional diffusion: multilateral organisations remain indispensable, yet increasingly operate alongside bilateral, regional and minilateral arrangements driven by different strategic priorities — creating the conditions in which China’s role becomes structurally significant.

China’s multi-layered food governance strategy

The expanding role in food governance of China is largely driven by structural necessity. In 2024, it imported around 105 million tonnes of soybeans — roughly 60% of global trade — alongside volumes of grains and edible oils. This reliance leaves Beijing highly exposed to climate shocks, geopolitical tensions and supply disruptions, reinforcing a strong interest in stable international food markets.

This expanding role in food governance reflects the alignment of institutional engagement with domestic strategic priorities. Since Qu Dongyu, formerly China’s vice-minister of agriculture and rural affairs, became FAO director-general in August 2019 — re-elected unopposed in July 2023 for a term running to July 2027 — China has gained greater visibility within the UN food system while concomitantly expanding South-South cooperation through the US$130 million FAO-China South-South Cooperation Trust Fund, agricultural technology centres and capacity-building programmes. The November 2025 Global South I-Dialogue on Agriculture further linked these global platforms to China’s wider development partnerships.

Domestic policy reinforces this external engagement. The 2019 State Council white paper explicitly commits China to actively participating in world food security governance — reflecting the view that internal resilience depends on international stability.

The same logic extends into regional and bilateral diplomacy. China has institutionalised agricultural cooperation with ASEAN through more than 40 agreements and over 300 technical cooperation projects, extended through the ASEAN-China Plan of Action (2026–2030). In addition, Beijing has signed agricultural and fishery cooperation agreements with more than 80 BRI partner countries and initiated over 650 agricultural investment projects.

Fragmented food governance

China’s expanding engagement has unfolded alongside a broader shift in global food governance: the rise of parallel arrangements operating alongside, rather than replacing, established multilateral institutions.

The proposed BRICS Grain Exchange illustrates this trend. Designed to develop alternative agricultural trading arrangements among BRICS members, it has been framed by Beijing as a tool for economic cooperation and market development. Others, however, see it as part of a broader effort to reduce dependence on Western-dominated commodity pricing and financial infrastructure.

Whether or not implemented, the proposal underscores a wider shift: food is increasingly treated as a strategic economic asset, placing China simultaneously on both sides of the governance ledger — a champion of open trade at APEC and a signatory to an arrangement that some argue is designed to circumvent that system.

Other major actors are advancing similar hedging strategies. Russia has used agricultural exports, particularly grain dependency, as an instrument of geopolitical influence in Africa. Gulf states have expanded sovereign wealth fund investments in overseas farmland, notably in Sudan and Ethiopia, alongside strategic reserves and diversified sourcing outside multilateral frameworks.

While food-related international organisations can continue to play an important role (such as providing humanitarian coordination) that no bilateral or minilateral arrangement has yet to replicate at scale — their formal authority is increasingly mismatched with the parallel mechanisms shaping food security outcomes.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a geopolitical and global strategy adviser interested in regional resource governance (land, energy, water) and environmental conflict in Asia. Currently, she is the Asia-Pacific analyst at The Red Line and a researcher at the Centre for Dialogue and Global Affairs. She is also an affiliated researcher at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Sweden, at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis and a non-resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum.

ThinkChina