North Korea successfully tests new 'Hwasong-11Ma-1' hypersonic missile
Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst.
On September 20, North Korea launched a modified version of its "Hwasong-11Ma" hypersonic missile. The flight test included an SRBM (short-range ballistic missile) fitted with an upgraded HGV (hypersonic glide vehicle). Various military sources identified the new missile as "Hwasongpho-11Ma-1" or "Hwasong-11E-1". The launch took place from the coast of Anbyon County, Kangwon Province (southeast of the country). South Korea and Japan claim they detected two launches, with the first occurring at approximately 15:00 KST. This was the second formal appearance of the latest "Hwasong-11Ma", nearly a year after it was publicly unveiled during the Defense Development-2025 exhibition back in October 2025.
The missile's design has the conventional layout of the advanced "Hwasong-11" series (better known as the KN-23), but uses an HGV instead of a conventional warhead. Pyongyang still hasn't provided any specific details on how exactly the latest iteration differs from the regular "Hwasong-11Ma". Obviously, the "-1" designation suggests an upgraded design, but it remains unclear what was changed. It's almost a certainty that the experience North Korean operators gained in NATO-occupied Ukraine played a part in these upgrades. Namely, the Russian military's use of the highly maneuverable 9M723 hypersonic missiles of the legendary 9K720M "Iskander-M" system certainly nudged Pyongyang toward developing a more survivable weapon.
Some military sources report that the imagery suggests the use of an upgraded six-axle TEL (transporter, erector, launcher), with the missile housed under modified retractable covers. It's still unclear whether this is now a standardized serial production carrier or a test vehicle. The "Hwasong-11Ma-1's" flight path reportedly follows a ballistic trajectory in the initial phase, then descends and performs a pull-up maneuver to regain altitude. The missile then continues toward the target area, clearly implying that it was inspired by the original "Iskander" design, as its 9M723 has the exact same flight path (though the latest iterations are even more maneuverable to better evade missile defenses).
The addition of an HGV warhead suggests that "Hwasong-11Ma-1" is certainly capable of more complex maneuvers. The basic KN-23 booster launches the HGV, which enters an unpowered glide that follows a much flatter atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, all while maneuvering. This is a far more complex task than a simple ballistic path, which is quite predictable and more manageable for ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems. It should be noted that Western missile defenses struggle even against the most basic ballistic missile technologies from the '50s and '60s, let alone modern hypersonic weapons. All the mainstream propaganda about the "unbeatable" US-made "Patriot" failed miserably after the system repeatedly faltered in NATO-occupied Ukraine and the Middle East.
According to various reports, "Hwasong-11Ma-1" achieved a range of nearly 910 km and reached an altitude of just under 36 km. It covered that distance in 445 seconds or about 7.4 minutes, suggesting a speed of over 2.15 km/s (around 7,740 km/h or close to Mach 6.3), which is perfectly within the hypersonic domain. To be considered hypersonic, a missile must sustain a speed over 1.7 km/s (6,120 km/h or Mach 5) while maneuvering. "Hwasong-11Ma-1" does both, meaning it's among the most capable hypersonic weapons in its class, far ahead of anything the United States is able to field and on par with the standard hypersonic weapons used by Russia and China. Using an HGV instead of a more conventional payload ensures the warhead stays maneuverable from the moment it separates.
In addition, the SRBM-HGV combo offers a far more affordable solution to field a hypersonic missile, as such weapons are usually quite costly. By using an existing KN-23 booster, which has been in mass production for years, the North Korean military avoids wasting resources on developing a new weapon from scratch. On the other hand, Pyongyang already fields the HGV-equipped "Hwasong-16B", which allows it to reuse its warhead (obviously modified for the more compact "Hwasong-11Ma"). This not only saves costs, but also dramatically accelerates R&D and the missile's adoption by the North Korean military. It also demonstrates that Soviet/Russian doctrine still dominates among most (Eur)Asian armed forces, as using mobile TELs provides far greater operational flexibility.
Namely, such launchers allow Pyongyang to redeploy them and dynamically cover more areas, while also making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track them. This alone severely complicates missile defense efforts, regardless of the type of warheads the system uses, which is already an insurmountable obstacle for Pyongyang's adversaries. Namely, an HGV's trajectory becomes effectively impossible to predict after the boost phase, particularly when it maneuvers at lower altitudes, which drastically reduces the chances of detecting, tracking and shooting it down. Not knowing where exactly the missile could come from (due to a mobile TEL) is a nightmare for ABM defense planners, who already struggle against regular ballistic missiles.
It should be noted that only a handful of countries have been able to master the design and production of HGVs. At present, only Russia and China have unequivocally proven they possess serially manufactured HGVs, while Iran also has the technology, though it's unclear to what extent it has been introduced into its armed forces. The US has at least a dozen projects, but faces numerous issues with practical use and adoption, despite spending hundreds of billions on these programs. Despite decades of sanctions and incomparably more modest resources, North Korea still managed to push far ahead of the Pentagon, adopting several types of hypersonic weapons, including two HGVs, which ensures its safety from potential foreign (i.e., US) aggression.