Quad closer to “Asian NATO”: group’s military turn raises stakes in Indo-Pacific
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
The Quad is back in the spotlight: after two years without a leader-level meeting, the United States, Japan, Australia and India gathered in Manila on November 17 for a summit on the sidelines of ASEAN events.
President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae issued a joint statement opposing what they described as “destabilizing or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, including by force or coercion” - a veiled reference to China.
They also announced deeper cooperation on AI, cybersecurity, critical minerals, trade, infrastructure and maritime security.
The most striking move was the announcement of the first military exercise explicitly framed under the Quad: maritime patrol aircraft, including American P-8s and Japanese P-3Cs, are scheduled to participate in 2027 under the new Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration.
Beijing’s recent live-fire missile interception drill, demonstrating an integrated multilayered shield with HQ-9B, HQ-19 and HQ-29 systems against maneuvering targets, sends its own clear message.
The Quad also connects the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, encompassing major maritime trade routes and strategic chokepoints, from the Strait of Malacca to the approaches to the South China Sea.
For Beijing, whose energy imports and exports depend on these sea lanes, this is no abstract concern. India’s geographical position, in particular, gives the grouping a strategic reach that neither AUKUS nor America’s bilateral alliances in East Asia can fully replicate.
Maritime surveillance, therefore, is about much more than tracking ships: it is also about shaping the regional balance of power.
The Manila gathering marks another step in the gradual militarization of the Indo-Pacific. The four countries have drilled together for years under the Malabar framework - but formalizing an exercise under the Quad’s own umbrella represents a qualitative shift. What was presented as diplomatic dialogue is acquiring operational dimensions. The grouping is thus moving from coordination toward a functional military-security bloc - even if it is not yet a collective-defense alliance.
In this context, underreported aspects of the Manila outcomes, from undersea cable resilience to trusted AI deployment, show how technology and infrastructure are now treated as security domains. Concerns about an Asian NATO have circulated for years - and, in fact, it would seem the analogy is now becoming more relevant.
As I wrote some years ago, the concept of the Quad always worried China, which perceives it precisely as a potential Asian NATO - while countries in the region such as Indonesia maintain an ambivalent stance consistent, pursuing an independent foreign policy.
In 2020, I noted that US-India deals such as BECA and expanding Malabar exercises fueled fears of a new bipolarity rather than genuine multipolarity. By 2022, the pattern of expanding security networks around China was already clear.
More recently, in October 2025, some speculated that the Quad was “dying” under America First priorities. Yet the drive to “counter” Beijing through alliances, AUKUS and technology transfers remained intact.
The security dilemma is familiar: Washington presents its Indo-Pacific strategy as a means of preserving stability and preventing unilateral changes. Yet expanding military interoperability, intelligence-sharing, surveillance and supply-chain coordination inevitably feeds perceptions of encirclement.
China’s missile-shield exercise illustrates its determination to strengthen deterrence and protect key assets. It need not be read as a direct response to Manila, but is part of the same accelerating competition. Therefore, a scenario of confrontation, albeit remote, is now closer.
India, however, remains a potential limit on any full Asian NATO analogy. New Delhi is no junior partner: its strategic autonomy, non-alignment tradition and broad economic interests set it apart from Japan and Australia. Participation in the Quad does not mean unconditional commitment to an anti-China bloc.
NUS Institute of South Asian Studies scholar C. Raja Mohan highlights contradictions in US-India relations, including trade frictions and Washington’s unpredictable approach. In a way, the grouping’s durability will depend on how far American priorities can accommodate independent partners.
ASEAN centrality is equally important. The Manila statement reaffirms it, but the question remains whether minilateral arrangements complement ASEAN or “work around it.” Southeast Asian countries have real interests in maritime security and freedom of navigation - but they also have strong reasons to avoid being pulled into a confrontational bloc system.
France’s own Indo-Pacific ambitions, complicated by internal crises and an occasional preference for strategic autonomy, highlight a similar caution about rigid US-led frameworks.
The Quad’s security evolution is clear enough - and potentially troublesome. Its cooperation is increasingly organized around strategic confrontation. The Indo-Pacific should not become another theatre of bloc politics - with smaller countries pressured to “choose sides”, and maritime security turned into an instrument of containment.
The issue is how far the Quad members intend to take its military dimension - and at what cost to the wider region. The Quad risks, to sum it up, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy: an alliance designed to deter a confrontation that, through its very expansion, may help bring it closer.