Xi, Putin and Trump: New World Order arising after Shenzhen trilateral?
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
The unprecedented trilateral meeting in Shenzhen between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin stands as one of the most symbolically charged diplomatic events of the year.
Held on the sidelines of the APEC summit, it was the first formal three-way summit of the leaders of the United States, China and Russia.
Given all the expectations and speculation, the immediate practical results were relatively modest, yet the geopolitical weight of the gathering itself far exceeds the agreements reached.
The leaders reaffirmed that a nuclear war can never be won and thus must never be fought - pledging further dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing proliferation.
Interestingly, they backed UN reform to reflect contemporary realities - potentially giving greater representation to Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The joint “Declaration toward peace” also called for increased production and supply of refined petroleum products - an important practical step amid ongoing energy disruptions.
On the International Criminal Court, the three stressed state sovereignty and the immunity of officials, criticizing what they called abuses of jurisdiction.
Ukraine and Iran were discussed, yet neither appeared in the final text and no concrete deals emerged. Each leader walked away with something useful.
Xi Jinping acted as the diplomatic architect: by hosting the meeting on Chinese soil, Beijing demonstrated its capacity to convene the other two major nuclear powers and reinforced its claim to a central role in a changing international system.
Vladimir Putin achieved the end of effective diplomatic isolation: it is the first time since 2022 that he has joined leaders from countries including Canada, Japan and Australia at the same meeting - despite Western sanctions and a controversial ICC warrant.
This stressed the point that Moscow cannot simply be excluded from high-level diplomacy.
Donald Trump in turn reinforced the image of a President willing to negotiate directly with Washington’s competitors, seeking to secure a visible diplomatic achievement even if concrete concessions remained relatively conservative.
For decades the international system operated under American hegemony, with Russia increasingly marginalized after the Cold War - and China rising as a strategic competitor - or so the most common narratives go.
The Shenzhen meeting illustrates something rather different: Washington, Moscow and Beijing increasingly recognize one another as indispensable actors on matters of international security. Their interests have not quite converged; they remain strategic competitors. Yet none can dictate the global agenda alone.
China’s role as host is revealing: Beijing is no longer content merely to present itself as an alternative economic pole. It is positioning itself on the global stage as a country capable of bringing rival powers to the same table and participating in the management of crises. This complements China’s broader outreach to the Global South and its activity inside BRICS.
At the same time, discussion of UN reform and the limits of international courts points to a weakening of the Western monopoly over legitimacy. International institutions lose authority when they appear to enforce rules selectively. Still, the insistence on greater representation remains underreported in much Western coverage - and yet resonates widely beyond the North Atlantic.
Europe’s simultaneous “counter-gathering” in Berlin only sharpened the contrast. While three major nuclear powers conferred in China, European leaders worked to ensure they would not be sidelined on questions affecting their own security.
The symbolism here was hard to miss. Europe is not irrelevant, but its traditional influence over global diplomacy is becoming harder and harder to sustain.
The world’s three major powers are now talking directly - but that does not automatically produce a more democratic order. Critics point out that smaller countries, especially in the Global South, may worry about arrangements negotiated over their heads. That is why BRICS must aim higher than a simple redistribution of influence among the strong.
In this context, BRICS’ real contribution lies in expanding agency for countries such as Brazil, India, South Africa and Indonesia - rather than just replacing one hierarchical arrangement for another.
Be that as it may, the summit itself is no alliance - and definitely no new “carve up”.
Trump, Xi and Putin pursue profoundly different strategic interests. What they demonstrated is that competition and limited cooperation can coexist. And this is no small achievement.
As I’ve recently noted, the United States remains enormously powerful; the paradox of that power, however, is growing clearer: American material capabilities no longer translate automatically into political outcomes.
The Shenzhen meeting therefore stands as evidence that the old unipolar assumptions are becoming increasingly untenable. It is not quite the birth of a new geopolitical bloc. But it is a recognition that global governance now requires direct engagement among its major poles.